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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN/DUBUQUE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AGRIPROCESSORS , INC.,
SHOLOM RUBASHKIN ,
BRENT BEEBE,
HOSAM AMARA,
ZEEV LEVI , and
KARINA PILAR FREUND,
Defendants.

No. CR 08-1324 LRR
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1324(a)(1 )(B)(i): Conspiracy to Harbor
Undocumented Aliens for Profit
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COUNT 2
8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a}(1 )(A) (iii),
1324(a)(1 )(A)(iv), 1324(a)(1 )(A)(v)(ll)
and 1324(a)(1 )(B)(i): Harboring and
Aiding and Abetting the Harboring of
Undocumented Aliens for Profit
COUNT 3
18 U.S.C. § 371 : Conspiracy to
Commit Document Fraud
COUNT 4
18U.S.C. §§ 1546(a) and 2: Aiding
ano Abetting Document Fraud
COUNIS 5-10
18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1) and 2:
Aiding and Abetting Aggravated
Identity Theft
COUNTS 11-12
18 U.S.C . § 1344: Bank Fraud

SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

PReSENTED IN OPEN COURT
BY THE
FOREMAN OF THE GRAND JURY
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE

GRAND JURY

And fil.ed

\\\20IO'b

ROBERT L PHELPS r

1

r- n"
1

COUNT 1

(Conspiracy to Harbor Undocumented Aliens)
(Agriprocessors, Inc., Sholom Rubashkin, Brent Beebe,
Hosam Amara, Zeev Levi, and Karina Pilar Freund)
Beginning on an unknown date and continuing to at least May 2008, in the
Northern District of Iowa and elsewhere, defendants AGRIPROCESSORS, INC.,
SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, BRENT BEEBE, HOSAM AMARA, ZEEV LEVI, KARINA
PILAR FREUND, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, did knowingly and
willfully combine, conspire, and agree to commit the following offenses for the purpose
of commercial advantage and private financial gain:
(1)

harbor one or more aliens at Agriprocessors, Inc.'s facility in Postville,
Iowa, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such aliens had
come to, entered and remained in the United States in violation of law, in
violation of Title 8, United States Code, Sections 1324(a)(1 )(A)(iii); and

(2)

encourage and induce one or more aliens to reside in the United States,
knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence was in
violation of law, in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Sections
1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).

This was in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Sections 1324(a)(1 )(A)(v)(l)
and 1324(a)(1 )(B)(i).

2

COUNT2

(Harboring Undocumented Aliens)
(Agriprocessors, Inc., Sholom Rubashkin, Brent Beebe,
Hosam Amara, Zeev Levi, and Karina Pilar Freund)
Beginning on an unknown date and continuing to at least May 2008, in the
Northern District of Iowa and elsewhere, defendants AGRIPROCESSORS, INC.,
SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, BRENT BEEBE, HOSAM AMARA, ZEEV LEVI, and KARINA
PILAR FREUND did, for the purpose of commercial advantage and private financial
gain:
(1)

harbor, and aid and abet the harboring of, one or more aliens at
Agriprocessors, Inc.'s facility in Postville, Iowa, knowing and in reckless
disregard of the fact that such aliens had come to, entered and remained
in the United States in violation of law; and

(2)

encourage and induce, and aid and abet the encouragement and
inducement of, one or more aliens to reside in the United States, knowing
and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence was in violation of
law.

This was in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Sections 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii),
1324(a)(1 )(A)(iv), 1324(a)(1 )(A)(v)(ll) and 1324(a)(1 )(B)(i).
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COUNT3

(Conspiracy to Commit Document Fraud)
(Agriprocessors, Inc., Shalom Rubashkin, Brent Beebe,
Hosam Amara, and Zeev Levi)
In about April and May 2008, in the Northern District of Iowa and elsewhere,
defendants AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, BRENT BEEBE,
HOSAM AMARA, ZEEV LEVI, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, did
knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, and agree to use, possess, obtain, accept
and receive documents prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence
of authorized stay and employment in the United States, that is, resident alien cards,
knowing such cards to have been forged, counterfeited, altered, falsely made, procured
by means of any false claim or statement, and to have been otherwise procured by
fraud or unlawfully obtained, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).
In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the object of the conspiracy, the
following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Northern District of Iowa and
elsewhere:
(1)

In about late April and early May 2008, defendants and Agriprocessors

poultry managers HOSAM AMARA and ZEEV LEVI each told coconspirator and poultry
supervisor Martin De La Rosa that several of the employees under his supervision were
to be terminated because they were known to be working under bad employment
documents. After several discussions, defendants AMARA and LEVI identified
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approximately six such employees who they would allow to continue working at
Agriprocessors if they obtained new documents. Defendant LEVI told De La Rosa to
instruct the employee~ to obtain new documents as soon as possible.
(2)

Shortly afterward, De La Rosa told a coconspirator and poultry leadperson

(herein after "poultry leadperson") to obtain new documents as soon as possible and to
tell the other five employees to do the same. As directed, the six employees each
obtained fake social security cards and resident alien cards and caused the documents
to be delivered to De La Rosa.
(3)

Thereafter, De La Rosa gave the six employees' new fake documents to

defendant LEVI, and defendant LEVI took the documents to Agriprocessors' Human
Resources department. Defendant LEVI returned from the Human Resources
department and told De La Rosa that there was a problem with the cards. Defendant
LEVI gave the documents back to De La Rosa.
(4)

Thereafter, De La Rosa returned the documents to the poultry leadperson

so that the poultry leadperson could attempt to have them corrected by the seller. The
poultry leadperson was not able to have the documents corrected and returned the
documents to De La Rosa and defendant LEVI.
(5)

Defendant LEVI took the documents to the Human Resources department

again. Defendant LEVI returned and told De La Rosa the documents were no longer
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needed, and the employees could continue working at Agriprocessors. LEVI gave the
documents back De La Rosa who caused them to be returned to the employees.
(6)

On or about May 8, 2008, defendant and Agriprocessors operations

manager BRENT BEEBE met with coconspirator and Agriprocessors beef department
supervisor Juan Carlos Guerrero-Espinoza to discuss employees in GuerreroEspinoza's department who were known to be working under bad employment
documents. Defendant BEEBE told Guerrero-Espinoza to meet with the employees and
determine how to help them.
(7)

Later that day, Guerrero-Espinoza met with several of the employees in

his department including a coconspirator and beef leadperson (hereinafter "beef
leadperson"). Guerrero-Espinoza told the employees that, in order to continue working
at Agriprocessors, they would have to get new identification documents in new names.
(8)

During the same meeting, the beef leadperson told the others that he

could obtain the new documents for the employees but that it would cost each
employee $300. The beef leadperson later spoke to his fake document source and the
cost was changed to $200 due to the volume.
(9)

After the meeting with the employees, Guerrero-Espinoza met with

defendant BEEBE and reported that the employees needed help with money an~ the
total cost to help the employees would be approximately $4,500. Defendant BEEBE
and Guerrero-Espinoza discussed trying to obtain a loan for the employees.
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Later that even.ing, defendant BEEBE took Guerrero-Espinoza to meet

with defendant and Agriprocessors vice president and chief executive officer SHOLOM
RUBASHKIN near the barn area at Agriprocessors. Defendant RUBASHKIN, defendant
BEEBE, and Guerrero-Espinoza discussed the employees in Guerrero-Espinoza's
department needing $4,500 in loans.
(11)

On or about May 9, 2008, defendant BEEBE and defendant RUBASHKIN

called Guerrero-Espinoza to a meeting in the area of defendant RUBASHKIN's office at
Agriprocessors. Defendant RUBASHKIN, defendant BEEBE, and Guerrero-Espinoza
again discussed the employees' need for $4,500 in loans. Defendant RUBASHKIN
agreed to loan the money. Defendant RUBASHKIN also suggested defendant BEEBE
and Guerrero-Espinoza provide similar assistance to other employees from other
departments at Agriprocessors.
(12)

Later on or about May 9, 2008, defendant BEEBE delivered $4,500 in

cash to Guerrero-Espinoza to be used for loans to the employees.
(13)

Later on or about May 9, 2008, Guerrero-Espinoza met with the beef

leadperson and several Agriprocessors employees in the offices of the beef department.
The employees provided money, photographs, fake names and dates of birth to the
beef leadperson. Guerrero-Espinoza loaned a portion of the $4,500 he had received
from defendant BEEBE to some of the employees from Guerrero-Espinoza's
department.
(14)

On or about May 9, 2008, defendant RUBASHKIN asked coconspirator

and Agriprocessors Human Resources department employee Laura Althouse to come
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to work on May 11, 2008, to process new application paperwork for several people.
Althouse agreed.
(15)

On or about May 10 and 11, 2008, the beef leadperson obtained new fake

social security cards and fake resident alien cards for the Agriprocessors employees
under Guerrero-Espinoza's supervision and many other Agriprocessors employees.
(16)

On or about May 11, 2008, defendant BEEBE directed Guerrero-Espinoza

to stop the beef kill approximately one hour earlier than usual.
(17)

That afternoon, the beef leadperson returned to Agriprocessors with the

new fake social security cards and fake resident alien cards. Guerrero-Espinoza and
the beef leadperson passed out the new cards to the employees in the offices of the
beef department.
(18)

Also on or about May 11, 2008, after obtaining their new fake cards, an

initial group of employees went to the Human Resources department. There, they met
with defendant RUBASHKIN, defendant BEEBE and Althouse. Defendant RUBASHKIN
inspected several of the new fake resident alien cards. Defendant BEEBE and Althouse
assisted the employees in completing new application paperwork using the names and
information on the fake resident alien cards. Guerrero-Espinoza arrived and assisted in
the process.
This was in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.
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COUNT4

(Aiding and Abetting Document Fraud)
(Agriprocessors, Inc., Sholom Rubashkin, Brent Beebe,
Hosam Amara, and Zeev Levi)
In about April and May 2008, in the Northern District of .Iowa, defendants
AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, BRENT BEEBE, HOSAM AMARA,
and ZEEV LEVI aided and abetted Agriprocessors employees who did knowingly use,
possess, obtain, accept, and receive resident alien cards. Defendants
AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, BRENT BEEBE, HOSAM AMARA,
and ZEEV LEVI then and there well knew the resident alien cards to have been forged,
counterfeited, altered, falsely made, procured by means of a false claim or statement,
and to have been otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained. Resident alien
cards ate documents prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of
authorized stay and employment in the United States.
This was in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546(a) and
Section 2.
COUNT 5-10

(Aiding and Abetting Aggravated Identity Theft)
(Agriprocessors, Inc., Sholom Rubashkin, and Brent Beebe)
In about May 2008, in the Northern District of Iowa, defendants
AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, and BRENT BEEBE, during and in
relation to the offenses set out in Counts 1, 2 and 4 above, did knowingly aid and abet
the transfer, possession, and use of, without lawful authority, means of identification of
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other persons. Specifically, defendants aided and abetted the transfer, possession and
use of resident alien numbers which were then assigned to other persons. The resident
alien numbers, identified by their last three digits and the names associated therewith,
were as follows:

CountS

645 (Ronald Sombra document)

CountS

458 (Yesmi Loera document)

Count7

790 (Lester Lopez document)

CountS

373 (Reynaldo Lopez Nunez document)

Count9

565 (Monica Hernandez document)

Count 10

598 (Lera Chernova document)

This was in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1) and
Section 2.

COUNTS 11 and 12
(Bank Fraud)
(Agriprocessors, Inc. and Sholom Rubashkin)
Introduction
On or about September 23, 1999, defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, INC.
(hereinafter "AGRIPROCESSORS") entered into a loan agreement with FirSt Bank
Business Capital, Inc. (FBBC), formerly known as FB Commercial Finance Inc. FBBC
10

is a subsidiary of First Bank, which is a financial institution whose deposits are insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. FBBC receives its funding from First
Bank. The original loan agreement was modified and amended. Under the most recent
version, the agreement allowed defendant AGRIPROCESSORS to borrow up to a
maximum of $35,000,000. At all times relevant to Counts 11 and 12 of this Indictment,
the actual amount of credit depended upon the amount of qualifying collateral defendant
AGRIPROCESSORS had available at any given time. The allowable balance to be
borrowed on the revolving loan was computed using a borrowing base formula which
included 85% of accounts receivable and 50% of inventory on hand. Throughout 2008,
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS consistently maintained a balance owed on this line of
credit in excess of $32,000,000.
Under the loan agreement, customer payments on accounts receivable
constituted part of FBBC's collateral for the revolving loan. Accordingly, the loan
agreement established a mandatory procedure for the immediate transfer of customer
payments to FBBC. The loan agreement required defendant AGRIPROCESSORS to
deposit in a depository account all collections on customer accounts immediately upon
receipt thereof and in the form received. Until such payments were so deposited or
otherwise delivered to FBBC, the payments were to be held in trust by defendant
AGRIPROCESSORS for and as the property of FBBC. At all times relevant to Counts
11 and 12 of this Indictment, a depository account was established at Decorah Bank
and Trust Company (the depository account) for the purpose of receiving such
payments.
11

The loan agreement included certain representations and warranties on behalf of
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS. Among them, defendant AGRIPROCESSORS
represented and warranted that it was not in violation of any law, statute, or regulation
applicable to defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, which violation would in any respect
materially and adversely affect the collateral or defendant AGRIPROCESSORS'
property, business, operations or condition (financial or otherwise). Each time
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS requested an advance of funds on the revolving loan,
an officer was required to certify that defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' representations
and warranties in the loan agreement were true as of the date of the request. In
addition, each time defendant AGRIPROCESSORS requested an advance on the
revolving loan, an officer was required to certify the amount of available collateral.
At all times relevant to Counts 11 and 12 of this Indictment, defendant SHOLOM
RUBASHKIN was a vice president of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS and exercised
day to day control over its finances.
Defendant AGRIPROCESSORS requested an advance on the revolving loan
nearly every business day during the life of the revolving loan.
The Scheme to Defraud

Beginning on a date unknown to the grand jury and continuing through about
October 2008, in the Northern District of Iowa and elsewhere, defendants
AGRIPROCESSORS and SHOLOM RUBASHKIN knowingly executed, and attempted
to execute, a scheme to obtain funds under the control of First Bank and FBBC by
means of fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises.
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It was part of the scheme that defendant RUBASHKIN caused false certifications
to be sent to FBBC on behalf of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS regarding defendant
AGRIPROCESSORS' compliance with laws and regulations. Defendant RUBASHKIN
certified defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' compliance with laws and regulations even
though, as defendant RUBASHKIN well knew, defendant AGRIPROCESSORS was
knowingly harboring undocumented aliens.
It was also part of the scheme to defraud that defendant RUBASHKIN, on behalf
of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, and contrary to the terms of the loan agreement,
diverted customer payments on accounts receivable. Defendant RUBASHKIN then hid
from FBBC the fact that the customer payments had been received by, among other
things, causing defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' books to inaccurately reflect that no
such payments had been received. By doing this, defendant RUBASHKIN caused
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' books to inaccurately reflect that customers owed
inflated amounts of money on their accounts. As a result, defendant RUBASHKIN
caused false certifications to ·be sent to FBBC on behalf of defendant
AGRIPROCESSORS regarding the amount of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS'
accounts receivable. Eventually, and in order to hide this portion of the scheme,
defendant RUBASHKIN caused checks of AGRIPROCESSORS and third party entities
he controlled to be drafted payable to defendant AGRIPROCESSORS and then
presented to FBBC in such a way that they fraudulently appeared to be from a customer
of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS.
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The Execution of the Scheme to Defraud

On or about the dates set forth below, defendants SHOLOM RUBASHKIN and
AGRIPROCESSORS, in execution and in furtherance of the scheme to obtain money
and funds owned by and under the custody and control of First Bank and FBBC,
knowingly caused the execution of the scheme as follows:
Count 11

On or about February 29, 2008, defendant SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, on behalf of
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, falsely certified to FBBC that defendant
AGRIPROCESSORS' representations and warranties stated in the loan agreement
were true as of that date. In fact," as defendant RUBASHKIN then knew, the
representations and warranties were not true as of that date because defendant
AGRIPROCESSORS was knowingly employing hundreds of illegal workers in violation
of law and regulations.
Count12

In about September 2008, without FBBC's knowledge, defendant
AGRIPROCESSORS received customer payments from its customer, C. M.P., in an
account other than the depository account. Defendant SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, on
behalf of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, delayed the deposit of those customer
payments into the depository account. During the period of delay, defendant
AGRIPROCESSORS used the money for its own benefit. Defendant RUBASHKIN, on
behalf of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, caused defendant AGRIPROCESSORS'
books to inaccurately reflect that such payments had not been received, and caused
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false certifications to be sent to FBBC which inaccurately stateq the inflated amount of
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' accounts receivable.
This was in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344.

A TRUE BILL
Is! Foreperson
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Date
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United .J0'""'-'V

By:

PETER E. DEEGAN ,
Assistant United States Attorney
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Assistant United States Attorney
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STATE OF IOWA
COUNTY OF LINN

1
1 ss:
1

AFFIDAVIT

I, David M. Hoagland, being duly sworn, depose and state:

TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE OF THE AFFIANT
1.

I, David M. Hoagland, make this affidavit in support of a search warrant of
the premises of Agriprocessors, Incorporated, Postville, Iowa (hereinafter
uAgriprocessors"). I am a Senior Special Agent with the United States
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE"), Office of Investigations in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. I
have been employed with this agency since July 1991. ICE agents are
authorized to investigate violations of offenses found in Title 8, Title 18,
and Title 19 (Customs) of the United States Code.

INTRODUCTION
2.

As a normal procedure of hiring employees in the United States, an
employer must ascertain whether a potential employee is a United States
citizen or lawfully present in the United States. As part of that hiring
process, the employer is required to have the applicant for employment
provide certain prescribed documents. These documents could include a
United States passport, a birth certificate, a social security card, a Form 1551 (sometimes referred to as a Permanent Resident Alien card or "green
card"), and various other proscribed documents. The employee initially
fills out the first section of an immigration Form 1-9 and indicates in the
appropriate blocks whether they are a citizen or national of the United
States eligible for employment, a lawful permanent resident, or a foreign
national with authorization for employment in the United States. With
regard to the last two options, the employee also must provide an
immigration "A" number issued by the Department of Homeland Security.

l

The employee then signs that portion of the form. The employer must
complete the second portion of the form based upon the document(s)
provided by the applicant for employment and indicate the type of
document(s) and any number (e.g., social security number) associated
with it. Additionally, the employer certifies that the employer has reviewed
the document(s) presented and the employer believes the applicant is
eligible for employment in the United States. The employer is required to
sign this portion of the form. In section 3 of the form, employers must
periodically re-certify that the applicant continues to be eligible for
employment. The employer must maintain the original l-9 and must
produce it upon request of the Department of Homeland Security.
Employers are required to retain 1-9 forms for three years after the date of
hire or for one year after employment is terminated, whichever is later. It
is a common practice for employers to attach to an l-9 form photocopies
of any documents produced by the employee in support of statements
made on the 1-9 form.
3.

I am aware of the information set forth below through personal
investigation, review of investigative reports, review of Social Security
Administration ("SSA") documents, review of Iowa Workforce
Development ("IWD") records, review of other public documents,
discussions with IWD personnel, and discussions with other law
enforcement officers. IWD is a State of Iowa government agency that
works in conjunction with the Iowa Department of Labor and is a
repository of documents for employees working in the state of Iowa.

4.

Over at least the last two years, ICE has received information concerning
immigration offenses at and by employees of Agriprocessors, including
allegations of harboring illegal aliens in violation of Title 8, United States
Code, Sections 1324(a)( 1)(A)(iii), 1324(a)( 1)(A)(iv), 1324(a)( 1)(A)(v)(ll),
and 1324(a)(1 )(B)(I); engaging in a pattern or practice of hiring and
continuing to employ. undocumented aliens in violation of Title 8, United
States Code, Sections 1324a(a)(1)(A), 1324a(A)(2), and 1324a(f)(1);
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document fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546;
misuse of social security numbers in violation of Title 42, United States
Code, Section 408(a)(7)(B); and aggravated identity theft in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1). This Affidavit sets
forth some, but not all, of the information ICE and other law enforcement
officers possess concerning potential violations of the above-referenced
statutes and potentially other criminal laws, but rather, is a summary of
evidence in ICE's possession sufficient to establish probable cause to
support this search warrant.
5.

This criminal search warrant is sought simultaneously with an application
for a so-called Blackies warrant 1 and in connection with the issuance of
697 criminal complaints and arrest warrants against persons believed to
be current employees of Agriprocessors for which the court determined
there was probable cause to believe those people violated federal criminal
laws. Of the approximately 697 charged by complaint, the government
currently possessed copies of photo identification for only about 15
individuals. Based upon the entire investigation to date, it is believed the
photo identification cards depict the actual person who has possessed
and used the identification. These photos will assist in identifying persons
using the name on the photo identification. However, for the vast majority
of subjects, the government does not possess photo identification using
the alias name on the complaint and warrant. It will be necessary to
attempt to identify, among those present at the facility during the search,
those individuals for whom there are currently arrest warrants. Further,
based on the information developed in the criminal investigation, there is
reason to believe there will be other employees present at the
Agriprocessors facility whose lawful authority to reside and work in the
United States is unknown, or who lack such authority. Accordingly, in
conjunction with the execution of this criminal search warrant, ICE intends

A "Blackie 's warrant" is so-named because of the case ofB lackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659
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to question any alien or person found on the Agriprocessors property
believed to be an alien as to his or her right to be or remain in the United
States (8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1 ), for purposes of determining whether the
alien should be administratively processed for removal from the United
States.
AGRIPROCESSORS

6.

Agriprocessors is a large multi-building meat processing complex located
at 220 West Street (also known as 220 North West Street), Postville, Iowa
52162. Agriprocessors opened in Postville in 1987 and now includes
most of the land and buildings in the area formerly occupied by Iowa
Turkey Products, Incorporated. The company is owned and operated by
the Rubashkin family, one member of which, Sholom Rubashkin, is the
Vice-President.

7.

Agriprocessors is in the business of slaughtering and processing of
kosher and non-kosher meat products. In its advertising, Agriprocessors
claims to be the largest kosher slaughterhouse in the nation.
Agriprocessors processes beef, poultry, chicken, veal, lamb, and turkey.

8.

Agriprocessors' facility in Postville consists of an approximately 60-acre
site on which there are many buildings. The facility is divided by railroad
tracks, with the majority of the buildings located on the north side of the
tracks. On the south side of the tracks, Agriprocessors has several
buildings devoted to turkey production. Both portions of the facility are
surrounded by a wire fence with multiple gates. Also on the property are
administrative buildings located on the east side of the north portion of the
property. All known areas of meat processing are located in the buildings
within the areas labeled A and B as outlined on Exhibit 1, an aerial
photograph of the Agriprocessors facility attached to this Affidavit. The
building within area C is an administration building. The land area labeled
A and C is owned by Agriprocessors. The land area labeled B is owned

F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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by Nevel West Estates, Inc. (a/kla Nevel Properties, Inc.), whose
registered agent is Shalom Rubashkin (Vice-President of Agriprocessors).
On the south side of the railroad tracks, the land areas labeled A and B
meet, are contiguous with no barrier between them, and form part of the
same operating facility at Agriprocessors. Each of the approximate areas
depicted as A and B on Exhibit 1 are surrounded by a chain link fence.
9.

Statistics retrieved from the Internet (www.agriprocessors.com) reveals an
estimated 800 employees working at Agriprocessors. Information
received from IWD reveal an estimated average of 900 employees
working at the plant.

10.

Based on information from Source #7, set out below in more detail,
Agriprocessors provides most of its employees with identification cards,
also called electronic swipe or proximity cards, used for identifying
employees. These cards are required for access to the Agriprocessors
plant and allow access by employees to certain portions of the facility.
These cards also appear to serve the function of a time card, recording
when an employee clocks in and out of work. The swipe cards have the
name of the employee affixed on the back of the card. Further details
about this system are set out in subsequent paragraphs. ·

11 .

Based on information from Source #7 (who is further identified in the
Source Information below), Agriprocessors pays most of its employees by
checks that are computer generated . A copy of a letter sent to an
employee in May of 2007 concerning the fact that the employee's social
security number did not match his/her name appears to be generated on
a computer, using a word processor. Within the last two years, ICE
agents have been present numerous times in the Agriprocessors
administrative building while obtaining 1-9 forms relating to employees of
Agriprocessors and have observed computers in the office. Therefore, it
is believed Agriprocessors uses computers in its business and does so
specifically with regard to employment documents. When conducting
criminal investigations of aliens employed at Agriprocessors during the
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past several years, ICE Special Agents have observed the Human
Resources Manager retrieve the original 1-9 forms from a binder in the
Human Resources Manager's desk. The same Human Resources
Manager has been employed at Agriprocessors for several years, and
remains in the same position as of the date of this application.

12.

Based on information from Source #7, Agriprocessors also maintains a
biometric identification system for most of its employees. The system
works by having each employee place their hand on a device that "reads"
biometric data from the hand. This appears to identify the employee and
also serve as a time clock. On April 25, 2008, Source #7 reported that
s/he was able to note the make and model of the biometric scanner used
by employees at Agriprocessors. The manufacturer of the scanner is
Ingersoll Rand, and the model was Hand Punch 4000 . An Ingersoll Rand
product brochure for the Hand Punch 4000 states that the system "uses
the size and shape of your employee's hand to verify their identity each
time they punch. No fingerprints or palm prints are utilized" . . . "The
terminal is fast and easy for anyone to use. Any employee's identity is
verified in less than one second." The brochure indicates that the system
also can track employee schedules, hours worked, and other information.
The system has a reported capacity of up to 3,498 users and can be
used in conjunction with a proximity or magnetic swipe card. An Internet
search of Ingersoll Rand's website resulted in a further description of the
device as a Hand Punch Biometric Time and Attendance Terminal Model
4000. Further details about this system are set out in subsequent
paragraphs.

13.

Based on information from Source #7, employees are provided with
lockers or individual storage areas ("cubby holes") for storing personal
items, including in some cases wallets and other items that may contain
identification information. Most employees are also required to carry on
their person the identification card issued by Agriprocessors and may also
carry other forms of identification.
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14.

Employees are issued pay checks at the Agriprocessors facility. The pay
checks have a detachable pay stub which contains pay and identity
information. In some cases (more fully explained below) these checks
may be issued in names other than the true name of the employee or the
name under which the employee is working at Agriprocessors. The
checks also exhibit the Social Security number under which the
employees are working. Based on the observations of Source #7, who
has seen other employees with checks while at the Agriprocessors facility,
some employees may have these pay checks or pay stubs on their
persons.

FORMER SUPERVISOR

Source #1
15.

ICE Special Agents interviewed Source #1 on November 6, 2007, in
reference to information originally provided to DHSIICE in January 2006,
that an Agriprocessors Human Resources Manager was hiring numerous
illegal workers. Source #1 said s/he was a former employee of
Agriprocessors and had worked there as a supervisor from approximately
2005 until approximately 2006. Source #1 stated that Agriprocessors
employed approximately 3,000 workers at the plant, farms, and other
businesses and property.

16.

Source #1 stated that nationals of Mexico, Guatemala, and Eastern
Europe were under the Source's supervision, and the Source estimated
80% of these employees were illegally present in the United States.
Source #1 stated there was an incident at Agriprocessors where Source
#1 discovered active drug (methamphetamine) production in the plant.
Source #1 stated the methamphetamine lab was partially destroyed by
Source #1 . This led to a physical confrontation with Source #1 's
immediate supervisor. Source #1 believes the incident led to Source #1 's
termination. Source #1 stated there were incidents of weapons being
carried in Agriprocessors. However, the Source was not sure if they were
being traded for drugs or being sold.
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17.

Source #1 stated that Agriprocessors is owned by Aaron Rubashkin, who
resides in New York, and that the day-to-day operations at the plant were
conducted by Heseshy and Sholom Rubashkin. Source #1 said there are
Rabbis employed at Agriprocessors who Source #1 believed entered the
United States from Canada without appropriate immigration documents.
Source #1 did not provide the basis for this belief.

18.

Source #1 described a conversation with the Agriprocessors Human
Resources Manager at her office concerning three separate social
security cards from three separate employees that contained the same
social security number. Source #1 stated the Human Resources Manager
laughed when this matter was brought to her attention.

19.

Source #1 stated the Human Resources Manager appeared to have a
large amount of money. In a conversation Source #1 had with the Human
Resource Manager's son, who was also employed at Agriprocessors at
the time, the son bragged about the significant amount of money his
mother had. Source #1 also discussed a conversation Source #1 had
with the Human Resources Manager regarding Agriprocessors'
employees' taxes and the fact they were deducted and deposited and
placed in bank accounts belonging to an unknown person or persons.

PAST ARRESTS OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS
20.

On or about August 30, 2007, ICE Special Agents processed a request
from the Iowa Department of Public Safety for assistance in identifying
individuals who were involved in an altercation that had occurred in
Postville, Iowa. The information resulted in the arrests by ICE Special
Agents and federal prosecution of three subjects. The three subjects,
identified as Source #2, Source #3, and Source #4, all said they were
foreign nationals unlawfully present in the United States.

Source #2
21 .

Source #2 , after being advised of Miranda rights in the Spanish language
and waiving those rights, stated the source's employment at
Agriprocessors began in 2005. During the employment application
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process, Source #2 presented a fraudulent Permanent Resident Alien
Card ("Form 1-551 ") (bearing number XX-XXX-823) and a fraudulent
social security card (bearing number XXX-XX-3641) to Agriprocessors.
Source #2 stated the Source's employment was terminated in 2007.
Source #2 stated the Source had never applied to Citizenship &
Immigration Services (hereinafter "CIS,) for authorization to reside or work
in the United States.
22.

Pursuant to an inquiry by ICE Special Agents, Agriprocessors provided an
Employment Eligibility Verification Form (hereinafter "Form 1-9")
apparently filled out and signed by Source #2. The Form 1-9 was certified
by the Human Resources Manager. The Form 1-9 was accompanied by a
photocopy of the fraudulent Form 1-551, number XX-XXX-823, presented
by Source #2 to gain employment at Agriprocessors.

23.

An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #2 was
negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been
previously granted to the subject. A NCIC search of Source #2's
fingerprints revealed a prior misdemeanor Operating While Intoxicated
charge.

Source #3
24.

Source #3, after being advised by ICE Special Agents of Miranda rights in
the Spanish language and waiving those rights, stated the Source's
employment at Agriprocessors began in 2003 or 2004. During the
employment application process, Source #3 presented a fraudulent Form
1-551 (bearing number XX-XXX-267) and a fraudulent social security card
(bearing number XXX-XX-8944) to Agriprocessors. Source #3 stated
his/her employment was terminated sometime in 2004. Source #3 stated
his/her employment was reestablished at Agriprocessors sometime in
2005. Source #3 again presented a fraudulent Form 1-551 (bearing
number XX-XXX-267) and a fraudulent social security card (bearing
number XXX-XX-8944). Source #3 stated his/her employment was
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terminated sometime in 2007. Source #3 stated the Source never applied
to CIS for authorization to reside or work in the United States.
25.

Pursuant to an inquiry by ICE Special Agents, Agriprocessors provided a
Form 1-9 apparently filled out and signed by Source #3. The Form 1-9 was
not certified by Agriprocessors as required by law; however, handwritten in
the Business or Organization Name and Address block was
"Agriprocessors, Inc. 220 West Street, PO Box 920, Postville, Iowa
52162." The Form 1-9 was accompanied by a photocopy of the fraudulent
Form 1-551 presented by Source #3 to gain employment at
Agriprocessors.

26.

In addition to the Form 1-9, ICE Special Agents received from
Agriprocessors a letter dated May 4, 2007, written in Spanish and English
and addressed to Source #3 from the Agriprocessors Human Resources
Manager. The letter reflected that the SSA had corresponded with
Agriprocessors and said that the social security number presented to
Agriprocessors by Source #3 to gain employment did not match the name
of the person to whom the number had actually been issued as reflected
in the SSA database. In that letter the Human Resources Manager
requested Source #3 provide proof the employee was resolving the
discrepancy with SSA and directed, if this information was not provided, a
new Form 1-9 must be completed with Agriprocessors by July 9, 2007.

27.

An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #3 was
negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been
previously granted to the subject. A NCIC search of Source #3's
fingerprints did not reveal any criminal history.

Source #4
28.

Source #4, after being advised of Miranda rights in the Spanish language
and waiving those rights, stated Source #4's employment at
Agriprocessors began in 2005. During the employment application
process, Source #4 presented a fraudulent Form 1-551 (bearing number
XX-.XXX-406) and a fraudulent social security card (bearing number XXX-
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XX-7893) to Agriprocessors. Source #4 stated his/her employment was
terminated in 2007.
29.

Pursuant to an inquiry by an ICE Special Agent, Agriprocessors provided
a Form 1-9 apparently filled out and signed by Source #4. The Form 1-9
was not certified by Agriprocessors, as required by law; however
handwritten in the Business or Organization Name and Address block was
"Agriprocessors, Inc. 220 West Street, PO Box 920, Postville, Iowa
52162." The Form 1-9 was accompanied by a photocopy of the fraudulent
Form 1-551 presented by Source #4 to gain employment at
Agriprocessors.

30.

An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #4 was
negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been
previously granted to the subject. A NCIC search of Source #4's
fingerprints revealed a prior misdemeanor Operating While Intoxicated
charge.

Source #5
31.

On or about December 6, 2006, ICE Special Agents processed a request
from the Decorah, Iowa, Police Department regarding a subject later
identified as Source #5 who was being held on State of Iowa criminal
charges. Source #5 was determined to be a foreign national unlawfully
present in the United States. An interview of Source #5 by ICE Special
Agents revealed Source #5 had been employed at Agriprocessors in
2006. Source #5 said the Source presented a fraudulent 1-551 bearing a
fictitious name to gain employment at Agriprocessors .

32.

Pursuant to an inquiry by ICE Special Agents , Agriprocessors provided a
Form 1-9 bearing the fictitious name and signature of Source #5. The
Form 1-9 was accompanied by a photocopy of the 1-551 presented by
Source #5, containing the fictitious name, to gain employment at
Agriprocessors. ICE Special Agents also recovered from Source #5 at the
time of his/her remand from the custody of the Winnesheik County
Sheriff's Office, an Agriprocessors payroll check, in the fictitious name that
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misdemeanor charge from Nebraska for consumption of alcohol on public
property.
Source #6
34.

On September 20, 2007, an ICE Detention & Removal Operations
(hereinafter "DRO") Immigration Enforcement Agent (hereinafter "lEA")
processed Source #6, an illegal alien from Mexico, for immigration
removal proceedings after Source #6 was remanded to ICE custody from
the Fayette County Sheriff's after disposition of a misdemeanor Operating
While Intoxicated charge. Source #6 stated the Source began
employment with Agriprocessors in 2004 on one of the farms as an
undocumented worker. The employment lasted two years. Source #6
was subsequently interviewed by an ICE Special Agent. Source #6 stated
the Source presented a fraudulent 1-551 and a fraudulent social security
card for employment, and a form 1-9 was completed at Agriprocessors.
No 1-9 has been requested of Agriprocessors.

Source #7
35.

On November 8, 2007, ICE Special Agents met with a confidential source
that had been previously used as a source of information by ICE
(hereinafter "Source #7"). Source #7 is currently authorized to work in the
United States based on an employment authorization document issued by
DHS/CIS. Source #7 has proven to be credible and has assisted in other
cases. Source #7's information and assistance in these prior cases led to
the conviction of two people on identity and document fraud charges.
Source #7 has been provided monetary assistance by ICE Office of
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Investigations for new cell phone service obtained as a result of this case,
for living expenses, rent, transportation costs, and to compensate for loss
of wages due to the wage disparity from Source #7's prior job, while
providing information in this investigation. A search of NCIC criminal
history information for Source #7 was negative.
36.

On November 8, 2007, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an
electronic audio monitoring device. At the direction of ICE Special
Agents, Source #7 went to Agriprocessors where Source #7 asked for,
and received, an employment application. Source #7 spoke to a female
employee who apparently works in the Human Resources Department
and speaks Spanish. Source #7 told the female the Source was not in
possession of a social security number to use. The female
Agriprocessors employee stated she could not hire Source #7 without
one. Source #7 departed the building and, on a street adjacent to the
previously departed building, Source #7 spoke with a person identified as
an Agriprocessors employee about getting a job at the company. The
apparent Agriprocessors employee stated that there were other
employees in the turkey processing area of the plant that are working
without papers. Source #7 understood this to mean illegal aliens were
working even though they did not have Social Security numbers. Source
#7 asked if the employee knew where a person could purchase fraudulent
papers in the local area. The employee stated that there was someone in
the area, but the employee didn't have a contact name. The employee
stated, however, that there was a guy (hereafter referenced to as "C") in
the turkey processing area who allowed employees under his direction to
work without papers, implying he was a supervisor. The employee
provided Source #7 her/his telephone number.

37.

On November 9, 2007, ICE Special Agents directed Source #7 to attempt
to telephone the Agriprocessors employee that the Source spoke to the
previous day, with negative results. ICE Special Agents wired an
electronic audio monitoring device to Source #7 and directed Source #7 to
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attempt to locate the Agriprocessors employee from the previous day, but
Source #7 was unsuccessful. Source #7 talked to a different Hispanic
male near Agriprocessors who identified himself as a Guatemalan
national. The Hispanic male stated that the Agriprocessors business
office would not hire without having "papers". However, the Hispanic male
stated there was a supervisor in the turkey processing area who would
employ the Source without papers and pay cash. Source #7 departed
and went to a different area in Postville, Iowa. Source #7 spoke to two
other Hispanic males who gave the same information about gaining
employment "without papers" in the turkey processing area and one
offered to show Source #7 where the supervisor lived . The unidentified
Hispanic male led Source #7 to a home in Postville where they went to the
door and made contact with the purported supervisor's spouse, who
stated that the supervisor was not at home and provided a telephone
number to Source #7 to call. The supervisor's spouse identified her
husband by the name of "C." Source #7 left the home with the Hispanic
male who stated the named supervisor paid employees separately in
cash. Source #7 attempted to make a recorded telephone call to the
telephone number provided, but was unsuccessful. Source #7 attempted
to contact the supervisor once again at his home, but was unsuccessful.
Another attempt to make a recorded telephone call to the supervisor was
finally successful. Source #7 told the supervisor that Source #7 was
looking for a job in Postville, whereupon the supervisor stated he could
not talk and could meet tomorrow. The call was terminated .
38.

On November 10, 2007, ICE Special Agents directed Source #7 to make
a telephone call to the supervisor, "C." The call was not recorded .
During the call, the supervisor told Source #7 to go to Agriprocessors and
fill out an application.

39.

On November 14, 2007, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an
electronic audio monitoring device. At the direction of ICE Special
Agents, Source #7 went to "C's" house where Source #7 met with him and
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Source #7 reminded her/him that they had spoken on the telephone
previously. Source #7 inquired about employment at Agriprocessors
without having any papers. "C," the supervisor, initially stated that Source
#7 should fix Source #7's social security number to be able to work.
Source #7 stated that, based on previous conversations with other
employees, Source #7 understood the supervisor would hire Source #7
without papers and pay cash. "C" stated he would speak to the Human
Resources Manager at the plant to inquire about employment and call
Source #7. Source #7 later positively identified "C" through a copy of "C's"
driver's license photo, and your affiant has confirmed that "C" is, in fact, a
supervisor employed at Agriprocessors. Source #7 left and went to other
locations in Postville, Iowa where Source #7 heard from other individuals
about getting hired by the supervisor and working for cash. Source #7
learned the Agriprocessors employees working for the supervisor wore
orange hard hats and, apparently, the employees that provided proof of
lawful employment wore green hats. Later that afternoon, Source #7
spoke to a neighbor at Source #7's apartment building about the attempts
to gain employment with the supervisor. The neighbor stated the
supervisor normally requires a referral from someone he knew and the
neighbor stated he may know someone who would refer Source #7.
40.

On November 16, 2007, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an
audio recording device. Source #7 made contact with numerous residents
of Postville. Source #7 was informed again by these contacts that "C," the
supervisor, hired employees with no employment documents and they
were paid cash. Source #7 also heard that there is an Agriprocessors
employee that transported other employees to Minnesota to obtain state
identification documents. Source #7 met with an employee of
Agriprocessors who stated that Source #7 could obtain a job as a forklift
operator at the plant, but Source #7 would need employment documents.

41 .

On November 17,2007, Source #7, using an audio recording device
provided by ICE Special Agents, engaged other Postville, Iowa residents
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in conversation. They stated they did not believe the supervisor was
currently hiring. However, they stated there may be another
Agriprocessors manager who was hiring employees without employment
documents and paying cash.
42.

On December 5, 2007, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an audio
monitoring device. ICE also provided Source #7 with a counterfeit social
security card and Form 1-551, containing unassigned numbers, to be used
in an attempt to gain employment. Source #7 entered the Agriprocessors
Human Resources Department and was told by an employee to take an
application home and return with it the following Tuesday.

43.

On December 11, 2007, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an
audio monitoring device. ICE Special Agents provided Source #7 with a
counterfeit social security card and Form 1-551, containing a fictitious
name and unassigned numbers, to be used in an attempt to gain
employment. Source #7 went to the Agriprocessors Human Resources
office, where Source #7 provided a female Human Resources employee
with the completed application and with the documents provided by ICE
Special Agents. The female employee returned with the Source #7's
documents and stated that they didn't match (meaning the name and
numbers didn't match). The female employee also stated this to at least
one of the other approximately 10 applicants in the waiting room. Source
#7 had a conversation with the other rejected applicant, and the applicant
provided Source #7 a telephone number where Source #7 could
potentially obtain good documents.

44.

On December 13, 2007, Source #7 told ICE Special Agents that Source
#7 called the telephone number provided by the other rejected applicant
from Agriprocessors and a Hispanic-sounding male answered. Source #7
inquired about obtaining identity documents to gain employment at
Agriprocessors. The Hispanic male stated that he was in California;
however, he could send identification documents via the mail. The
Hispanic male· said he had sent documents previously to residents of
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Postville, but they were not successful in obtaining employment based on
how strict Agriprocessors had become in their hiring process. Source #7
asked the Hispanic male if he could obtain any good documents, like a
birth certificate, and the Hispanic male replied he did not have any at that
time. Source #7 was directed by ICE Special Agents to not call the
Hispanic male again but to wait for a return call. According to the
information received by ICE Special Agents from Source #7, this return
call did not occur.
45.

On January 8, 2008, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an
electronic audio monitoring device. Source #7 made contact with the
Agriprocessors Human Resources office to present a valid social security
card provided by ICE Special Agents that contained information relating to
a legitimate number for a presumed United States citizen. The social
security number Source #7 provided on this occasion was different from
the social security number he had presented to Agriprocessors the prior
week, though slhe used the same name as before. Source #7 did not
witness the use of computers by Agriprocessors Human Resources staff;
however, the Source stated the Human Resources Manager would
periodically return to her office during the application process. Source #7
completed the initial application for the hiring process and was dismissed
for lunch to return later that day. Source #7 told ICE Special Agents there
were approximately 30 applicants for employment at the Human
Resources area. The Human Resources manager informed
approximately 12 of those applicants that they could not be hired due to
their documents not having legitimate identification numbers. After a
lunch period, Source #7 returned to the Agriprocessors Human Resources
department, completed the Form 1-9 as well as some type of insurance
paperwork, and attended a safety briefing. This training and completion
of paperwork were done in the presence of the Human Resources
Manager. Source #7 stated s/he was hired at $7.25 an hour and was
assigned the duty of hanging cattle in the plant. Source #7 was informed
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to report back the next day to complete orientation, and the day after that
Source #7 would begin employment. Source #7 stated all of the
applicants present appeared to be Hispanic and Source #7 believed they
were all illegally present in the United States, except one female who
claimed to Source #7 to be a United States citizen. Two of the applicants
claimed to have just crossed the United States border. Source #7 stated
the Human Resources Manager appeared to be aware that some of the
employment applicants may be illegal aliens based on her statements,
directions, and the assistance she provided. Source #7 gave an example
of the Human Resources Manager informing the applicants that provided
her with 1-551's for employment that they are supposed to be "legal" so
they needed to check the permanent resident alien box on the Form 1-9.
The Agriprocessors Human Resources employee stated (in Spanish) to
Source #7 and the fellow applicants for employment, while assisting them
in the completion of Form 1-9, that:
"Those that are American citizens are going to put an X in the first
square. Those who are permanent residents are going to put an X on the
second square. Those who are only foreign (unintelligible portion of tape).
I believe the majority are permanent residents but those who have a
driver's licen . .. Those who have shown a driver's license, I don't know
what they are."
The applicants laughed. The Agriprocessors Human Resources
employee continued and spoke to Source #7 and stated "Okay, Your ...
Mark the first square. U, I don't know what". Source #7 stated "Citizen."
The Agriprocessors Human Resources employee continued "Mark the first
square. Okay?" Apparently the applicants continued to find humor in this
situation and they and the Agriprocessors Human Resources employee
continued to laugh. The Agriprocessors Human Resources employee
continued to assist the applicants with ascertaining their immigration
status in the United States and then continued helping them complete the
1-9 and assisting individuals that produced immigration documents as to
what an immigration 'A' number is and where to place it. The
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Agriprocessors Human Resources employee continued to explain what
type of immigration documents should constitute a check mark in which
box. Additionally the Agriprocessors Human Resources employee cited
that underneath the squares, indicated above, that there was a line for an
employee's signature. An Agriprocessors Human Resources employee
stated that "your signature should be your first and last names." She
assisted all of the applicants with the employment forms and apparently
speaks fluent Spanish. She provided the safety briefing in Spanish.
46.

On January 9, 2008, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an audio
recording device. Source #7 made contact with the Agriprocessors
Human Resources department to continue the orientation process.
Source #7 stated that the orientation consisted of more safety briefings
conducted by a female Agriprocessors employee. During the safety
briefings, one of the points emphasized was the safe handling of knives at
the meat processing plant that are used in the process of butchering the
various animals processed at Agriprocessors. Based on the observations
of Source #7, a large number of knives are used by employees in the
Agriprocessors facility. The Agriprocessors Human Resources employee
continued later on in the briefing and stated that employees would be
docked two dollars a week from their pay for the use of gowns and glove,
of which usage is mandatory. Source #7 was also notified that a proximity
card would be issued for entry into Agriprocessors.

47.

On January 10, 2008, Source #7 contacted an ICE Special Agent to
inform the agent that Source #7 began employment at Agriprocessors and
worked 14 hours that day. Source #7 stated an identification/proximity
card was issued to enter the plant and to electronically clock the hours
worked. Source #7 said a co-worker told her/him that the co-worker did
not have good papers and that he does not electronically clock in and out,
but instead signs in and out. Source #7 stated that the co-worker may be
paid in cash. Source #7 stated that the equipment issued to perform the
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work in the hazardous conditions of the plant was substandard and
previously used.
48.

On January 18, 2008, Source #7 told ICE Special Agents that there
appeared to be four to six hundred employees working during the same
time frame as Source #7 and approximately one hundred additional
employees departing from the midnight shift when Source .#7 arrived for
work in the morning. Source #7 stated there was at least one other
employee who was earning less than Source #7 was earning and at least
one other employee that Source #7 believed to be illegal and received a
different colored check than Source #7. Source #7 stated the
identification/proximity card issued to Source #7 on the first day of
employment was used each work day initially at a security gate near the
human resources building. ICE Special Agents observed that Source #7's
identification card appeared to have a proximity device attached to it to
electronically access the Agriprocessors complex. Source #7 said that
once an employee was in the main meat processing area at
Agriprocessors, the identification card was again used for further access.
In the alternative, employees could manually enter their employee number
that is also contained on the card. Source #7 stated there was a light
sensor machine adjacent to the location where the identification card is
used and that the subject's hand was placed on this device and was
scanned. Even when using the light sensor machine, an employee must
still use a swipe card or enter their ID number. Source #7 stated there are
many Rabbis employed inside the plant and some speak Spanish.
Source #7 also observed that the laborers, including Source #7, wore
white hats; the cleaning/trash crew wore brown hats; the inspectors wore
red hats; the team leaders wore green hats; and the supervisors wore
yellow hats and carried radios.

49.

On January 25, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the
prior week's pay stub that reflected hours worked and included overtime
pay. The pay stub appeared to be generated by computer and contained
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Source #7's name and the last four digits of the social security number
Source #7 provided to Agriprocessors. Source #7 stated there was an
employee that had been working for the past two months who stated he
was from Guatemala and received a different colored check than Source
#7. The Guatemalan's check did not have uAgriprocessors" written in the
corner (as did the checks Source #7 received) . Source #7 also described
an oral altercation by a Rabbi who was calling employees derogatory
names and throwing meat at employees. Source #7 said the employees
in the chicken processing area were suspected of being paid cash and
apparently ·wore blue hats. Source #7 also said the rent for the Source's
apartment in Postville had been increased and, based on what other
Hispanics told him, it was a common practice for the landlords who rented
to tenants in that area to frequently increase rents.
50.

On February 1, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the
prior week's pay stub that reflected hours worked and included overtime
pay. Source #7 said there was a co-worker that Source #7 met whose
paycheck was a different color and who did not have an Agriprocessors
identification card. The co-worker asked one of the Rabbis why he didn't
have an employee card to swipe through the time clock. The Rabbi told
the co-worker the worker would have to have shown valid documents to
obtain one. According to the co-worker, he brought a green card the next
day and the Rabbi somehow checked it and said it wasn't valid. The coworker was allowed to continue in his previous employment capacity.
Source #7 stated another Rabbi asked Source #7 if the documents
Source #7 presented were valid . The Rabbi continued with the
conversation and cited the state of origin for the social security card
Source #7 provided for employment (without Source #7 previously
indicating where it was issued). The Rabbi asked Source #7 where s/he
was born. Source #7 stated s/he was born in the State indicated on
her/his Social Security card , but explained s/he traveled back to Mexico at
a young age. The Rabbi said that was good because the rest of the
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workers did not have any papers. Source #7 stated there was another
increase in rent at the Source's apartment.
51 .

On February 15, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the
prior week's pay stub that reflected hours worked that included overtime
pay. Source #7 said a group of between 50 and 100 employees, that
Source #7 believed to be illegal, had never presented documents to gain
employment at Agriprocessors. They received a different colored pay
check than did Source #7. According to what Source #7 heard from other
employees, these employees were supposedly told by Agriprocessors
management to provide identification documents in the next thirty days or
they would be terminated.

52.

On February 22, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the
prior week's pay stub that reflected hours worked that included overtime
pay. Source #7 said one of the floor supervisors, identified by Source #7
as a Hasidic Jew, duct-taped.the eyes of an employee that Source #7
believed to be an undocumented Guatemalan. The floor supervisor then
took one of the meat hooks and hit the Guatemalan with it, apparently not
causing serious injuries. Source #7 asked the Guatemalan to report this
incident to the front office, but the Guatemalan stated that it would not do
any good and could jeopardize his job. Another incident occurred where a
different floor supervisor, identified by Source #7 as a Hasidic Jew,
pushed Source #7 because the supervisor did not like the way Source #7
was moving meat. Source #7 said the persons Source #7 believes to be
undocumented Guatemalans were experiencing difficulties getting paid
their different colored checks and they were asked to return at 4:00P.M.
on Friday to receive them after being dismissed from work for the day at
1:00 P.M.

53.

On February 29, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the
prior week's pay stub that reflected hours worked that included overtime
pay. Source #7 said , from what other workers are telling him/her, the
undocumented Guatemalans that were paid via a different colored check
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have begun to obtain fraudulent documents to present to Agriprocessors.
Source #7 said there was a person believed to be a Mexican national
working at Agriprocessors who was providing fraudulent documents
through a vendor in Postville. Source #7 was not able to provide further
details.
54.

On March 7, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the prior
week's pay stub that reflected hours worked that included overtime pay.
Source #7 said s/he saw some of the checks the undocumented
Guatemalans were provided by Agriprocessors and they were green.
Source #7 stated the neighbor of Source #7 handles trash at
Agriprocessors and wore a white hard hat.

55.

On March 15, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the prior
week's pay stub that reflected hours worked that included overtime pay.
Source #7 said a former co-worker told Source #7 that a Postville
resident, possibly a local government official, was in charge of the green
checks issued to the undocumented workers at Agriprocessors. Source
#7 said the resident was known as "Mr. Boss" and no other identifiers
were known to Source #7. Source #7 said upper-level managers wore
orange hats, the Rabbis and chicken workers wore blue hats, the group
supervisors wore yellow hats, the foremen wore green hats, the inspectors
wore red hats, and the remaining floor workers wore white hats.

56.

On March 28, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the prior
week's pay stub that reflected hours worked and included overtime pay.
Source #7 restated that, upon entry to Agriprocessors' main meat
processing area where Source #7 was employed, an employee placed his
or her hand on a scanner that has four lights and two posts with which to
align the hand. The employee identification number is input into a
machine that allows a green light to come on apparently indicating the
name and number match. Source #7 restated employees hired without
papers did not use this scanner. Source #7 stated a Guatemalan
employed on the same line as Source #7 has received fraudulent
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documents and submitted them to the Agriprocessors Human Resources
office. Source #7 stated Agriprocessors was continuing to hire new
employees as well. Source #7 related a conversation Source #7 had with
another employee; that employee stated he had a conversation with a
supervisor and asked the supervisor where they should go if Immigration
came. The supervisor stated Immigration wouldn't be coming because
Agriprocessors takes taxes out of the employees' checks. Additionally,
Source #7 stated there were mostly Mexican and Guatemalan nationals,
as well as some El Salvadorians, employed at Agriprocessors.
57.

On April 04, 2008, Source #7 stated Agriprocessors continued to hire new
employees and had recently terminated some females as well as other
employees Source #7 believed to be juveniles.

58.

On April 11, 2008, Source #7 stated his/her shift was from 2:00 a.m. until
2:00 p.m. Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the prior two
weeks' pay stubs that reflected hours worked and overtime pay. Source
#7 stated Agriprocessors did not hire last week and had terminated six
young male employees for reasons unknown to Source #7. Source #7
stated there was talk among the employees of Immigration coming to raid
the plant; however, Source #7 did not feel it was resulting in a wide
spread fear. Source #7 also said one of the Rabbis previously involved in
demonstrating violent behavior with employees was again involved in an
oral altercation in which the Rabbi called an employee "stupid." Source
#7 said s/he had heard from other employees that the turkey processing
area of Agriprocessors was in operation on the south side of the railroad
tracks from the main meat processing plant where Source #7 was
employed. ICE Special Agents provided Source #7 with an overhead
picture of the Agriprocessors complex where Source #7 pointed out a
series of buildings adjacent to and to the south of the railroad tracks area
where the turkey processing took place.

59.

On April 18, 2008, Source# 7 provided ICE Special Agents the prior
week's pay stub that reflected hours worked and overtime pay.
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Additionally, Source# 7 stated that two individuals with beards, and
identified as brothers as well as the owners by a co-worker, visited the
Agriprocessors meat processing line. Source# 7 also stated that, a
couple of weeks ago, the last four undocumented Guatemalans were fired
by Agriprocessors. The Source stated the supervisor identified as "C"
may be working nights in a different part of the plant.
60.

On Apri125, 2008, Source# 7 provided ICE Special Agents the prior
week's pay stub reflecting hours worked and overtime pay. ICE Special
Agents showed Source# 7 a photo retrieved from the Internet
(http://recognitionsystems. ingersollrand.com) of the Ingersoll Rand
(hereinafter "IR") Hand Punch Biometric Time and Attendance Terminal
Model4000. The Source confirmed that the Hand Punch terminal on the
photograph appeared to match the system used by Agriprocessors to
record time and attendance. Source# 7 also told ICE Special Agents that
s/he spoke to a neighbor who told the Source that s/he had heard that
approximately 60 employees who work for "C" were going to be fired . The
Source # 7 did not receive any further intelligence relating to this
information. The neighbor also told the Source that the neighbor's brother
was traveling to Postville, Iowa from Guatemala in an attempt to gain
employment at Agriprocessors. Source # 7 did not gain any further
intelligence relating to this information. Source# 7 also told ICE Special
Agents that "Mr. Boss" is the owner of an apartment complex in Postville,
Iowa.

61 .

Previous intelligence received by ICE Special Agents has revealed that a
man by the name of R. W. works for the elementary school in Postville,
Iowa and recently sold an apartment complex to Agriprocessors. R. W. is
also known to carry an envelope of cash with him/her at school to pay
employees of Agriprocessors. R. W. is also listed as the point of contact
on letters sent by Agriprocessors to employees noting that they have been
identified as having misunderstandings regarding the employee's social
security number.
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Sources 8. 9, & 10
62.

On or about May 1, 2006, ICE Special Agents assisted the Federal
Bureau of Investigation with identifying individuals involved with the
production of a potential explosive device. The device was found in a
vehicle registered to a resident of Postville. Further investigation showed
the likely source for the materials used to construct this device was the
Agriprocessors mechanical shop. When officers attempted to interview
three suspects at Agriprocessors concerning their knowledge of the
explosive device found in the car, and the owner and operator of the car,
an Agriprocessors supervisor ("C") escorted the employees to the office
for the interview and gave one employee a fictional name to provide to
officers regarding the person who sold them the car. On May 4, 2006,
pursuant to this investigation, ICE Special Agents arrested three subjects,
identified here as Source #8, Source #9, and Source #1 0.

Source#8
63.

Source #8, in a consensual interview conducted in the Spanish language
prior to arrest by ICE on May 4, 2006, was shown his/her employment
application for Source # 8 on file with Agriprocessors. Source #8 began
employment in 2004. Source #8's application contained the social
security number XXX-XX-9281. A photocopy of the fraudulent Form 1-551
(bearing number XX-XXX-871) that Source #8 presented in conjunction
with the completion of the 1-9 was shown to Source #8. Source #8
admitted the document was fraudulent and purchased through an
illegitimate source, in conjunction with the social security card , and that
both were used to gain employment at Agriprocessors.

64.

An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #8 was
negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been
previously granted to the subject. A NClC search of Source #8's
fingerprints did not reveal any prior criminal history.

65.

During a search of Source #8's residence in Postville on May 4, 2006,
agents recovered a SSA Request for Employee Information letter- OMB
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Form 0960-0508 (commonly referred to as SSA Decentralized
Correspondence or "DECOR Letter"), dated April 22, 2006, and
addressed to Source #8. The DECOR letter pertained to the tax year
2005 earnings Source #8 received from Agriprocessors. The DECOR
letter is a document sent by the SSA to employees when the SSA has
determined the Social Security number utilized by an employee does not
match SSA records. Thus, the DECOR letter serves as a notice to
employees of potential non-matching social security information.
Source #9
66.

Source #9, in a consensual interview conducted in the Spanish language
prior to arrest by ICE on May 4, 2006, was shown his/her employment
application on file with Agriprocessors. Source #9 began employment in
2002. Source #9's application contained the social security number XXXXX-8316. A photocopy of the fraudulent Form 1-551 (bearing number XXXXX-153) that Source #9 presented in conjunction with the completion of
the 1-9 was shown to Source #9. Source #9 admitted it was a fraudulent
document and was purchased through an illegitimate source, in
conjunction with the social security.card, and that both were used to gain
employment at Agriprocessors.

67.

An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #9 was
negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been
previously granted to the subject. A NCIC search of Source #9's
fingerprints did not reveal any prior criminal history.

Source #10
68.

On May 4, 2006, an ICE Special Agent, with FBI Special Agents present,
conducted a consensual interview in the Spanish language of Source #1 0.
ICE Special Agents subsequently obtained Source #1 D's employment
application file from Agriprocessors, along with his/her Form 1-9.
Employment documents showed Source #1 0 began employment in 2005.
Source #1 O's application contained the social security number XXX-XX8756. A fraudulent Form 1-551 (bearing number XX-XXX-388) and social
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security card (bearing number XXX-XX-8756), that Source #1 0 provided
when filling out the 1-9 were found while the search of the home where
Source #10 resided was conducted. The Form 1-9 was not certified by
Agriprocessors, as required by law; however, handwritten in the Business
or Organization Name and Address block was "Agriprocessors, Inc., 220
West St., PO Box 920, Postville, Iowa 52162." Source #10 admitted both
of these documents were fraudulent and purchased through an
illegitimate source.
69.

An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #1 0
was negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been
previously granted to the subject. A NCIC search of Source #1 O's
fingerprints did not reveal any prior criminal history.

Source #11
70.

On April14, 2008, ICE agents spoke to Source #11 who had come to ICE
custody from the Allamakee County Sheriff's Department after disposition
of a misdemeanor charge. Source #11 said the Source gained
employment at Agriprocessors in 2007, without presenting employment
documents or filling out any employment forms. Instead, Source #11 said
a friend working at Agriprocessors asked an unknown supervisor at
Agriprocessors if Source #11 could be employed. That same day, Source
#11 began working at Agriprocessors. Source #11 stated that, when the
first paycheck was received , it had another unknown person's name on it.
This check was then taken to another portion of the plant where it was
cashed . A work identification card with a proximity sensor attached was
issued to Source #11 in the same last name under which s/he was paid,
but with a different first name.

71 .

On April 17, 2008, an ICE Special Agent conducted a follow-up interview
of Source #11 . Source #11 stated the Source worked in the north end of
the large main meat processing plant where Agriprocessors' employees
processed chickens. ICE Special Agents showed Source #11 an aerial
map of the Agriprocessors' complex, which included buildings located
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generally south of railroad tracks which run through a portion of the
Agriprocessors facility. The area south of the railroad tracks is believed to
be a portion of the former Iowa Turkey Products, Inc. Source #11 said
that area is where other Agriprocessors employees process turkeys.
Source #11 said the Source knows this because this is where Source #11
had friends that worked. Source #11 stated both areas had mostly
Hispanic workers from Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras and the
undocumented workers were employed alongside the presumably
documented employees. The difference, Source #11 stated, was the
undocumented workers were paid $5.00 an hour, and after three or four
months of working they started making $6.00. Source #11 stated the
undocumented workers were paid in cash and emphasized this point by
pretending to count out money by hand. However, Source #11 stated the
employees that had been seen clocking in and out are all using an
electronic swipe card used to enter the building and track their time. This
process did not produce a paper punch card, but rather produced an
electronic record of an employee's hours. Based on the description of the
system provided by the sources, it appears the swipe cards generate an
electronic record, through a centralized computer database located on the
Agriprocessors site, from which payroll is calculated.
72.

On January 31, 2008, ICE ORO lEA processed Source #12, an illegal
alien from Mexico, for immigration removal proceedings after Source #12
was remanded from the Allamakee County Sheriff's Office after
disposition of State criminal charges. The lEA interviewed Source #12
and, based on what Source #12 said or how the agent interpreted what
Source #12 said, the agent understood that Source #12 worked for "Con
Agri Processors" as an undocumented worker from approximately 2002 to
the present. Source #12 was subsequently interviewed by ICE Special
Agents. During that interview, Source #12 said s/he was employed at
Agriprocessors for the past five or six years. Source #12 said s/he did not
initially complete a form 1-9 when s/he began working at Agriprocessors.
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Source #12 said s/he was paid cash for the first year of employment and
subsequently filled out a form 1-9 using a Mexican Consular Identification
card . Source #12 said s/he had been in contact with a manager from
Agriprocessors while incarcerated; the manager stated Source #12 could
come back to work at Agriprocessors after s/he was released.
73.

Pursuant to an inquiry by ICE Special Agents, Agriprocessors provided
the Form 1-9 filled out and signed by Source #12 on August 19, 2003.
The social security number annotated on the form 1-9 was XXX-XX-0207.
The form 1-9 was certified by an Agriprocessors Human Resources
Assistant and the Business or Organization Name and Address block was
filled in with "Agriprocessors, Inc. 220 West St., PO Box 920, Postville,
Iowa 52162." The Form 1-9 was accompanied by photocopies of the front
and back of a fraudulent form 1-551 (number XX-XXX-055) presented by
Source #12 to gain employment at Agriprocessors.

74.

A subsequent post-Miranda interview of Source #12 was conducted by
ICE Special Agents. The Agents showed Source #12 his/her form 1-9 and
attached copies of the form 1-551. Source #12 said s/he had procured a
fraudulent 1-551 and social security card through an illegitimate source
and subsequently presented them for employment at Agriprocessors.
According to Source #12, the Source completed the form 1-9 and
presented the form 1-551 and social security card to Agriprocessors after
Source #12 had worked at Agriprocessors for one year and after Source
#12 received a letter from Agriprocessors requesting proof of eligibility for
employment.

75.

An ICE indices check conducted by the lEA on Source #12 was negative,
noting that lawful status in the United States had not been previously
granted to the Source. A NCIC search of Source #12's fingerprints
revealed two prior Operating While Intoxicated misdemeanor charges and
a Sexual Abuse 2nd, the latter of which appeared to be dismissed.
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OTHER CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF ILLEGAL ALIENS WORKING AT
AGRIPROCESSORS
76.

Between approximately 2004 to 2007, law enforcement authorities in Iowa
encountered at least 9 individuals in connection with the investigation of
other criminal conduct by those people, including fighting, criminal
mischief, drug activity, driving offenses and other matters. During
subsequent investigations by ICE Special Agents, these individuals were
found to be in the United States unlawfully, and to have obtained false
and fraudulent identification documents in order to secure employment.
Through the use of these false documents, these nine people worked at
Agriprocessors from approximately 2004 to 2006. Each of these nine
people were subsequently convicted of violations of federal criminal law.

NOTICES SENT TO AGRIPROCESSORS OF NON-MATCHING SOCIAL
SECURITY NUMBERS
77.

Information was previously obtained by ICE Special Agents from law
enforcement sources of numerous partial SSA Employer Correction
Request for Educational Correspondence (hereinafter "EDCOR") letters
addressed to Agriprocessors. These partial EDCOR letters list the
discrepancies between employee names and the social security numbers
reported by the employer on Wage and Tax statements (Forms W-2) for a
specific tax year. This discrepancy normally means that the social
security number and name do not match what is contained in the SSA's
official records. It could also mean the number reported by
Agriprocessors has not yet been issued to any person. These EDCOR
letters revealed that Agriprocessors was notified via five separate letters
of 500 social security number discrepancies, one letter of 461 social
security number discrepancies, one letter of 68 social security number
discrepancies, one letter of 52 social security number discrepancies, one
letter of 42 social security number discrepancies, one letter of 37 social
security number discrepancies, one letter of 24 social security number
discrepancies, and one letter of 22 social security number discrepancies
for the tax years as follows:
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a.

An EDCOR letter dated May 05, 2006, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were at least 500 social security
number discrepancies for employee records relating to the tax year
2005.

b.

An EDCOR letter dated April 21, 2006, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were 68 social security number
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2005.

c.

An EDCOR letter dated March 24, 2006, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were 52 social security number
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2004.

d.

An EDCOR letter dated March 24, 2006, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were 42 social security number
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2003.

e.

An EDCOR letter dated March 24, 2006, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were 37 social security number
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2002.

f.

An EDCOR letter dated March 24, 2006, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were 24 social security number
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2000.

g.

An EDCOR letter dated May 19, 2005, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were at least 500 social security
number discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year
2004.

h.

An EDCOR letter dated May 19, 2005, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were at least 500 social security
number discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year
2003.

I.

An EDCOR letter dated May 19, 2005, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were at least 500 social security
number discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year
2002.
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j.

An EDCOR letter dated May 19, 2005, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were at least 500 social security
number discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year
2001.

k.

An EDCOR letter dated May 19, 2005, frpm SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were 461 social security number
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2000.

I.

An EDCOR letter dated May 09, 2002, from SSA to
Agriprocessors, stated there were 22 social security number
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2001.

78.

On February 28, 2008, ICE Special Agents received from the SSA the
EDCOR letters sent to Agriprocessors during 2006. The information
returned consisted of one EDCOR letter sent from SSA to Agriprocessors
on April 21 , 2006, and one EDCOR letter sent on May 05, 2006.
a.

The copy of the EDCOR letter sent on April 21, 2006, to
Agriprocessors reflected that SSA informed Agriprocessors that 68
of the social security numbers reported by the company for tax year
2005 did not agree with SSA records .

b.

The copy of the EDCOR letter sent on May 05, 2006, to
Agriprocessors reflected that the SSA informed Agriprocessors that
at least 500 of the social security numbers reported by the
company for tax year 2005 did not agree with SSA records.

The SSA stated there were no EDCOR letters sent to Agriprocessors
during calendar year 2007. The SSA confirmed in its response that it
does not maintain copies of any Decentralized Correspondence
("DECOR") letters notifying individual employees that the social security
number used by that employee during a specific time period does not
agree with SSA records. Unlike EDCOR letters, which are sent to
employers, DECOR letters are sent to employees to let the employee
know the reported name and social security numbers do not match SSA
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records. DECOR letters may be sent to an employer, however, when an
employee's address is incomplete or incorrect.
79.

A search of the SSA public website for information on EDCOR letters
revealed that employers are only sent an ED COR letter for the first 500
employees found with social security number discrepancies, based on
Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS") W-2 information submitted
by that employer, and it is incumbent on the employer to obtain additional
no-match information on any additional discrepancies above the 500
already received.

ICE ANALYSIS OF 2007 NO-MATCH INFORMATION
80.

On or about October 12, 2007, ICE Special Agents inquired of CIS
whether Agriprocessors was a registered participant in the Enumeration
Verification System ("EVS"). EVS is a CIS-sponsored employer program
that allows a company to submit an employee's name and social security
number to the SSA for verification. The SSA then verifies whether the
employee's name matches the name to which the social security number
was assigned, and conveys the information to the company. CIS reported
that Agriprocessors is not a participant in EVS. On or about April 22,
2008, ICE Special Agents again checked with CIS to determine if
Agriprocessors had, since October 2007, registered to participate in EVS,
and determined that it had not.

81.

In February 2008, ICE Special Agents obtained "no match" information
from the SSA for employees at Agriprocessors during the last two
quarters of 2007 and analyzed that information. On February 20, 2008,
ICE agents received social security "no match" information from the SSA
for 833 Agriprocessors employees suspected of using invalid social
security numbers or social security numbers belonging to other real
people. These 833 employees were all reported as having earned wages
while working at Agriprocessors during the third quarter of 2007. All 833
employees were found to have either used invalid social security numbers
or social security numbers assigned to names of other people.
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82.

On February 28, 2008, ICE agents received additional social security "no
match" information from the SSA for an additional 22 Agriprocessors
employees suspected of using invalid social security numbers or social
security numbers belonging to other real people. These 22 employees
were all reported as having earned wages while working at Agriprocessors
during the fourth quarter of 2007. All22 employees were reported by SSA
to either have used invalid social security numbers or social security
numbers assigned to names of other people.

83.

Based on the "no match" information received from the SSA for social
security numbers used by Agriprocessors employees during the third and
fourth quarters of 2007, about 737 current Agriprocessors employees are
believed to be using a social security number not lawfully issued to that
person. Due to the turnover in the Agriprocessors work force, the exact
number of employees varies somewhat from quarter to quarter. The 737
fourth-quarter employees include about 147 using social security numbers
confirmed by the SSA as being invalid social security numbers (never
issued to a person) and about 590 using valid social security numbers,
however the numbers did not match the name of the employee reported
by Agriprocessors as having used that number during employment.

OTHER EVIDENCE

84.

ICE agents used the Accurint database to further research the validity of
the social security numbers used by Agriprocessors employees. Accurint
is a web-based application tool available to law enforcement personnel for
the purpose of searching for identity information, address location,
financial records, property information, business listings, employment
records, phone information, and other identifying information. Accurint
uses a proprietary data-linking technology to gather the search results via
more than 100,000 different public records and non-public information
sources to aid in fraud detection and identity solutions. This includes such
sources as Department of Motor Vehicles, County Assessor's Office, and
private credit' reporting entities. For example, if a social security number is
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placed in the appropriate block of the search information that is queried
for a person, then a name, or a list of names, for the person or persons
who have previously used that social security number, and their address
and telephone number (if available), will be shown. If there is no name
associated with that social security card, or if that person is known to be
deceased, then that will be reflected as well.
85.

A request from ICE Special Agents to the IWD for an Employer's
Contribution and Payroll Report Form 65-5300 (hereinafter "Payroll
Report") for the 2nd Quarter of 2007 (April, May, and June of 2007) for
Agriprocessors revealed there were 1,116 employees reflected as
receiving wages for that time period. A search was conducted by ICE
agents in the Accurint database for the individual social security numbers
listed in the 2nd Quarter 2007 Payroll Report. This search revealed that
approximately 878 out of 1,116 (78.6%) of the social security numbers
input into Accurint either did not appear to be associated with the person
assigned to that social security number or the number did not reveal any
person associated with that number. This analysis would not account for
the possibility that a person may have falsely used the identity of an actual
person's name and Social Security Number. In my training and expertise,
I kn.ow it is not uncommon for aliens to purchase identity documents which
include Social Security Numbers that match the name assigned to the
number.

86.

ICE Special Agents conducted a search by social security number of the
Federal Trade Commission's (hereinafter "FTC") Consumer Sentinel
Network database that is used for reporting incidents of identity theft. The
search revealed that a person who was assigned one of the social
security numbers being used by an employee of Agriprocessors has
reported his/her identity being stolen .

87.

A request from ICE Special Agents to the IWD for a Payroll Report for the
3rd Quarter of 2007 (July, August, and September of 2007) for
Agriprocessors revealed there were 1,063 employees reflected as
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receiving wages for that time period. A search was conducted by ICE
agents in the Accurint database for the 109 new employees whose
additional social security numbers were listed in the 3rd Quarter 2007
Payroll Report. This search revealed that approximately 83 out of 109
(76%) of the social security numbers input into Accurint either did not
appear to be associated with the person assigned to that social security
number or the number did not reveal any person associated with that
number. The previous 2"d quarter IWD Payroll Report of persons who
had left employment showed that, based on the previous Accurint queries,
126 out of 162 (77%) had what appeared to be discrepancies. This left a
total of 835 of the current 1063 employees (78.5%) as having
discrepancies based on Accurint checks. A search by social security
number of the 109 new employees was conducted in the FTC's Consumer
Sentinel Network database did not reveal any person reporting his/her
identity as being fraudulently used by an unknown party.
88.

On February 20, 2008, ICE Special Agents in Cedar Rapids received a
copy of the 2007 fourth quarter Payroll Report for Agriprocessors from
IWD. The fourth quarter payroll report reflects the names and social
security numbers reported by the company for employees who earned
wages during the months of October, November, and December of 2007.
A review of this report revealed that the company reported paying wages
to a total of 968 employees during the fourth quarter of 2007. An analysis
of the report by ICE agents showed that 52 new employees at
Agriprocessors were paid during the fourth quarter that were not recorded
as having been paid on the Payroll Report for the third quarter of 2007.
Accurint law enforcement record checks revealed that approximately 22 of
the 52 (42%) newly reported social security numbers used by employees
of Agriprocessors either related to a real person's name that did not
match the name listed on the payroll report, or the Accurint checks did not
reveal any information relating to that social security number. Based on a
comparison of the third and fourth quarter payroll reports for
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Agriprocessors, and the Accurint law enforcement record checks, it
appears that approximately 99 of the 148 (67%) employees who were
reported on the 2007 third quarter report, but not reflected on the 2007
fourth quarter report, had social security number discrepancies. Thus,
according to the reviews of the third and fourth quarter payroll reports
combined , approximately 737 of the fourth quarter employees reported by
Agriprocessors appear to have social security number discrepancies.
89.

A comparison was made of the May 5, 2006, EDCOR letter sent from
SSA to Agriprocessors to the combined "no match" information from
February 20, 2008, and February 28, 2008, that was received from SSA
and derived from both the third and fourth quarter Agriprocessors Payroll
Reports. This analysis revealed that approximately 141 of the social
security numbers were shown as still being actively used by employees at
Agriprocessors.

SUMMARY OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION

90.

It appears that based on:
a.

The apprehensions in the years of 2004 through 2007 by ICE
Special Agents of known criminal offenders, the majority of whom
were later prosecuted in federal district court for their use of
fraudulent documents, and who have stated that their employer
was Agriprocessors;

b.

The EDCOR correspondence that shows that Agriprocessors has
repeatedly been made aware that large numbers of its employees
were using social security numbers that have discrepancies for
each tax year from 2000 to 2005;

c.

The indices checks conducted by ICE employees in commercial
and government databases, and the IWD Payroll Reports for 2007,
reflect discrepancies between the name attributed to each social
security number in those databases and the working name and the
social security number used for employment at Agriprocessors;
and,
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d.

-

Based on information thus far developed in this investigation, it
appears, based on 2007 fourth quarter payroll reports, that
approximately 76% of the 968 employees of Agriprocessors were
using false or fraudulent social security numbers in connection with
their employment,

That there is probable cause to believe that (a large percentage
approximately 76% as of the 41h Quarter 2007) of the total workforce
reported to IWD, nearly all of which appear to be Agriprocessors floor
workers, used fraudulent documents or documents with social security or
other identification numbers that were lawfully issued to others, or not
issued at all, and are currently employed unlawfully by Agriprocessors. In
addition, there is probable cause to believe there may be some
Agriprocessors employees paid in cash who are not reported to IWD, and
who are currently employed illegally without valid documents.

HARBORING RELATED TO VEHICLE TITLE AND REGISTRATION FRAUD
91.

The United States Postal Inspection Service ("USPIS"), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and the Iowa Department of
Transportation ("DOT") have investigated possible document fraud
involving the titles and registration of vehicles used by employees of
Agriprocessors. The following is based on information provided to your
affiant by these agencies.

92.

In September 2005, the DOT began investigating reports of questionable
title transactions between Des Moines and Allamakee Counties.
Burlington is the County Seat for Des Moines County and Postville is
located in Allamakee County. The suspect applicants showed addresses
in Burlington, Iowa, but registration renewals were repeatedly made in
Allamakee County.

93.

A DOT Investigator who spent time in the Postville area noted a high
number of license plates from Des Moines County. From time to time, the
Investigator had involvement with vehicles in the Postville area during
traffic stops made while working formerly as a Postville Reserve Police

39

Officer. The DOT Investigator also reviewed vehicle title transactions as a
DOT Investigator. The majority of the vehicles showed Des Moines
County addresses on the registration and title information despite the
vehicles consistently remaining in Postville, even after ownership
changed. The Agriprocessors facility contains a parking lot for
employees. By driving into Postville and going through the parking lot at
Agriprocessors, the DOT tnvestigator was able to determine that a large
number of the vehicles in question appeared to be driven by employees of
Agriprocessors and parked in the company parking lot during the
employees' shifts.
94.

The DOT Investigator was aware that a supervisor at Agriprocessors was
connected with the sales of vehicles. On at least one occasion, the
supervisor had retrieved or attempted to retrieve vehicles from
impoundment at the Postville Police Department on behalf of another
Agriprocessors employee. A number of the vehicles appeared to have a
link to a car dealership located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa ("Dealership").

95.

In October 2005, DOT Investigators audited the Dealership. The
managers of the Dealership stated that the Agriprocessors'

supervi~or

("C") was a personal friend of theirs. They stated they had been selling a
large volume of cars through the Agriprocessors' supervisor to people in
the Postville area. The Dealership managers had supplied vehicles
directly to the Agriprocessors supervisor for resale in Postville, in violation
of Iowa law, which requires all vehicle dealers be licensed. In the year
2005, more than 50 vehicles were sold to people in the Postville area.
According to the DOT Investigator, sales to Postville residents appeared
to represent approximately 90% of the business for the Dealership. In
many cases, the dealership's files contained copies of the ultimate
purchaser's resident alien or social security card and other identification
information.
96.

According to the Dealership managers, pursuant to the arrangement "C"
had with the Dealership, "C" supervisor would contact the Dealership and

40

indicate the need for a specific type of vehicle. The Dealership would
then purchase the vehicle at auction. The Agriprocessors supervisor
would pick up the vehicle in Cedar Rapids and pay for the vehicle at that
time. The Dealership managers did not know the price the Agriprocessors
supervisor charged the customers in Postville.
97.

Though the vehicles were sold to people in Postville, they were being
titled in Des Moines County, Chickasaw County, and a few other counties.
The information provided to the county treasurers was often different
from the information contained in the Dealership records. A Special
Agent with the Office of Inspector General, Social Security Administration,
confirmed that the majority of the social security numbers used on
applications for registration of vehicles did not belong to the person using
the number.

98.

The DOT Investigator was told, by unconfirmed sources, that the
Agriprocessors supervisor forced Agriprocessors employees to purchase
vehicles from him or they would be fired or given poor work shifts.
According to an unconfirmed source, a former Clayton County Deputy
Sheriff said the Agriprocessors' supervisor told the former deputy that the
Agriprocessors' supervisor had $80,000 of his personal money loaned out
to Agriprocessors employees in connection with selling them vehicles.

99.

In the fall of 2005, the DOT investigator attempted to speak with several
of the purchasers of the vehicles. When he attempted to do so at the
Agriprocessors plant, he discovered that the Agriprocessors supervisor
("C") had personally escorted the employee to the office for the interview
with the DOT Investigator and waited outside the room during the
interviews. When the DOT Investigator decided to terminate the attempt
to interview employees at the plant, the Agriprocessors supervisor
confronted the Investigator and appeared visibly angry about the
investigation.

100.

A short time later, the Investigator contacted an Agriprocessors'
employee, Source #13, off site of the plant, and interviewed him/her about
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the purchase of a vehicle from the Agriprocessors' supervisor. A few days
after this interview, Source #13 filed a complaint with the Postville Police
Department, asserting that the Agriprocessors' supervisor had threatened
Source #13 about being interviewed by the DOT Investigator. Source #13
reported that the Agriprocessors supervisor threatened to harm Source
#13 and also fired him/her.
101.

The DOT Investigator learned from talking with Des Moines County
Treasurer's Office personnel that a person hereafter referred to as Source
#14 was involved in making applications to title and register cars in Des
Moines County on behalf of people living in Postville. In the fall of 2005,
the DOT Investigator interviewed Source #14 at the Des Moines County
Treasurer's Office. Having been advised of and waiving his Constitutional
rights, Source #14 stated that s/he would receive the application
information or vehicle title information from two people in Postville, one
hereafter referred to as Subject 1 (an Agriprocessors' employee) or
another Subject Z. Source #14 received the documents (application
information or title information for the transfer) via the mail, along with
money. Source #14 then applied at the Des Moines County Treasurer's
Office for the registration and title on behalf of the owner, using one of
several addresses in the Burlington or West Burlington area. Source #14
advised her/his friends living at those addresses to expect to receive the
registrations and titles in the mail. Source #14 arranged to pick the
documents up from her/his friends and then sent them to Postville in bulk
to be provided to the vehicle owner. Source #14 reported doing th is more
than 200 times, and s/he received a small fee each time.

102.

On October 3, 2006, FBI and ICE Special Agents interviewed Source #15,
a citizen of Guatemala. Source #15 stated s/he began work at
Agriprocessors in October 2004, gaining employment by providing
fraudulent social security and resident alien cards to the company.
Source #15 began work in the turkey kill part of the Agriprocessors facility.
Source #15 described the work as very difficult and that it hurt Source
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#15's hands, so Source #15 requested a transfer to another area of the
plant. Source #15's request was turned down by the Agriprocessors
supervisor. Other Agriprocessors employees told Source #15 that, in
order to get a favorable position in the plant, Source #15 would have to
purchase a car from the supervisor. In January 2006, the supervisor
approached Source #15 and offered to sell him/her a car, but Source #15
declined. When Source #15 asked for a transfer, the supervisor refused.
103.

Your affiant knows, based on his training and experience, that
undocumented aliens sometimes title vehicles in false identities using
fraudulent documents and using false or fraudulent addresses to avoid
detection by law enforcement and immigration authorities.

EXPLOITATION OF ILLEGAL ALIENS AS INDICIA OF HARBORING

104.

Your Affiant is aware, from his training and experience, that those who
employ illegal aliens often exploit the aliens in various ways. Those who
knowingly employ or supervise illegal aliens, knowing their unlawful status,
are able to exploit illegal aliens because illegal aliens are unlikely to
contact authorities for fear they will be arrested and/or deported.
Exploitation can take on many forms, such as requiring employees to
provide money or other things of value to maintain employment or secure
better working hours or tasks, providing sub-par working conditions, failing
to pay overtime, and physically harassing or mistreating employees.

105.

In this case, as outlined in paragraphs 86 through 98 above, there is
probable cause to believe an Agriprocessors supervisor has assisted, for
a cut of the proceeds, illegal aliens in obtaining false documentation in
relation to purchasing vehicles, and thereby has aided in harboring the
illegal aliens. The supervisor has also required illegal aliens to purchase
vehicles through the supervisor in an attempt to secure better working
conditions, as indicated by Source #15.

106.

As further evidence of harboring illegal aliens through exploiting their
reluctance to contact the authorities, your Affiant is aware that the Iowa
Department of Labor has uncovered workplace safety problems at
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Agriprocessors. On March 21, 2008 the Cedar Rapids Gazette reported
that the Division of Labor Services for the State of Iowa issued to
Agriprocessors 39 citations with proposed penalties of $182,000 for
allegedly violating state workplace safety and health standards. According
to the article, a health inspection done on February 11, 2008, identified 13
serious health violations. On October 31, 2007, an inspection by the
Division of Labor Services resulted in 26 citations, including two repeat
violations.
107.

On April1, 2008, during testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, Agriprocessors was among three
packing plants cited for having a history of safety violations. According to
the testimony, during the period of April 2001 to February 2006, OSHA
records show no less than twenty violations at AgriProcessors' Postville
plant. Of these, twelve were identified by OSHA as serious. An
examination of Agriprocessor's Postville plant's "OSHA 300" logs revealed
five amputations along with dozens of other serious injuries such as
broken bones, eye injuries and hearing loss. The witness also testified
that there is concern that injuries are often unreported or under-reported.
The witness also cited numerous reports in the media regarding workers'
mistreatment at Agriprocessors, including a 2006 article "In Iowa Meat
Plant, Kosher 'Jungle' Breeds Fear, Injury, Short Pay," published in a
newspaper The Forward.

108.

Following an article in The Forward, the Washington Post reported on July
7, 2007, that some conservative rabbis who toured the plant were
shocked. " We found people arriving from the mountainsides of
Guatemala on a Tuesday and being on the front of the production line on
Wednesday . . .. We saw people who could barely read Spanish getting
training in English and having no idea what was said to them."

109.

On March 27, 2007, over twenty current and former employees filed a civil
suit in the U.S. Court for the Northern District of Iowa against
Agriprocessors, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
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lawsuit alleged that Agriprocessors failed to pay workers for time spend
preparing for and cleaning up after work. Seven of those plaintiffs are
included among the employees listed on the third and fourth quarter of
2007 IWD reports as working for Agriprocessors using social security
numbers which did not match the names to which they were assigned, or
that were unassigned to any person. The lawsuit was settled out of court.
REQUEST TO SEARCH FOR AND IDENTIFY ALL SUBJECTS OF CRIMINAL
COMPLAINTS
110. On April 16, 2008, the United States filed criminal complaints against 697

current Agriprocessors employees under their alias names, charging them
with unlawfully using social security numbers in relation to their
employment in violation of Title 42, United States Code, Sections
408(a)(7)(B); aggravated identity theft in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1 ); and/or possession or use of false
identity documents for purposes of employment in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1546. Three of those subjects have
subsequently been encountered and arrested by local authorities on
unrelated criminal charges. Because the true identities of the 697
subjects was unknown at the time, (and with the exception of three people
remain unknown today) the court issued "John Doe" arrest warrants which
describe the subject by the name under which the su~ject is employed at
Agriprocessors. Each of these subjects was listed on the fourth-quarter
payroll records obtained from IWD. (Though ICE has requested payroll
records from IWD for the first quarter of 2008, IWD has advised that
Agriprocessors has not yet reported that information to IWD.) There is
probable cause to believe one or more of those subjects are present at
Agriprocessors during regular working hours. This Search Warrant
Application seeks authorization to search the Agriprocessors plant and
curtilage for and identify any of those 697 employees for whom the United
States obtained a criminal complaint.
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REQUEST TO SEARCH FOR AND SEIZE IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS
FROM PERSONS

111.

As explained in the prior section, the government filed criminal complaints
against 697 employees of Agriprocessors who were reportedly working
there under aliases. With the exception of approximately 15 of those
people for whom the government has photographs, (and the three who
have recently been encountered by local authorities) the government
cannot positively identify the other people who are subject to the arrest
warrants due to their suspected use of assumed names and/or Social
Security numbers or other means of identification. Moreover, determining
the identities of all employees at the Agriprocessors's facility, including a
determination of their lawful status (whether a United States citizen, lawful
permanent resident alien, an alien eligible for employment, or an illegal
alien) and what percentage of the workforce is illegally in the United
States and employed at Agriprocessors, constitutes potential evidence of
violations of law, including possible harboring of aliens by Agriprocessors
and/or its management and supervisors. In other words, in harboring
cases, the percentage of the workforce that is working legally, versus the
percentage of the workforce that is working illegally, constitutes evidence
of harboring admissible at a criminal trial against those accused of
harboring the illegal aliens. Based on the facts set forth in this Affidavit,
there is probable cause to believe that Agriprocessors' employees
possess, either on their persons or in lockers or similar storage areas at
the facility, company-issued identification cards, drivers' licenses and
other forms of identification. (As part of this investigation, ICE Special
Agents have confirmed from an Iowa DOT database that Iowa drivers
licenses have been issued to many of the employees for whom ICE has
"no-match" social security information.) Furthermore, false or fictitious
immigration documents, social security cards, and similar fraudulent
identification documents constitute contraband, the possession of which is
itself illegal. Your affiant also knows from his training and experience that
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illegal aliens often attempt to dispose of or discard identification
documents during an immigration raid either at the instruction of their
employer or based on their own volition. Management or supervisory
personnel may sometimes pick up or collect these discarded identification
documents in an effort to conceal the harboring of the illegal aliens. The
agents intend to engage in consensual conversations with employees
concerning their identification, and to request voluntary production of
identification documents. This Search Warrant Application seeks
authorization to, if necessary, search for and seize from each person
believed to be an employee of Agriprocessors any and all Agriprocessorsissued identification cards, Agriprocessors-issued entry or proximity cards,
drivers' licenses, or other means of identification from any person or any
location within the Agriprocessors facility.
REQUEST TO SEARCH AND SEIZE BIOMETRIC INFORMATION

112.

As stated in the previous paragraph, determination of the identities of all
employees at the Agriprocessors's facility, including a determination of
their lawful status (whether a United States citizen, lawful permanent
resident alien, an alien eligible for employment, or an illegal alien) and
what percentage of the workforce is illegally in the United States and
employed at Agriprocessors, may constitute evidence of violations of law,
including possible harboring of aliens by Agriprocessors and/or its
management and supervisors. Moreover, Agriprocessors uses swipe
cards and/or biometric devices to identify employees and as a form of
time clock, registering the hours of employment. There is probable cause
to believe that having employees place their hand on the biometric device
used in the plant on the day of the search will reveal evidence of the
identity of the employee and provide further evidence as to hours of work.
Having the employees "clock out" using the biometric devices on the day
of the search will, incidentally, aid in ensuring the employees are paid for
any time they worked on the day of the search. This Search Warrant
Application seeks authorization to search for and seize biometric
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information using Agriprocessors' biometric identification system. This will
be accomplished by having employees "clock oue by either placing their
hand on the biometric device and/or using the swipe cards issued to
employees as necessary to disclose the identity evidence contained in the
system. This Search Warrant Application also seeks authorization to
search for and seize from Agriprocessors any electronic or computer
hardware, software, or storage devices utilized by the company in
connection with the biometric identification system, as set forth below in
more detail.
REQUEST TO SEARCH FOR AND SEIZE ALL DES MOINES COUNTY
VEHICLE TITLE AND REGISTRATION INFORMATION
113. One or more Agriprocessors supervisory employees are involved in

harboring, or aiding and abetting the harboring, of illegal aliens by
assisting them to obtain titles and registrations for vehicles in their false
names, and by arranging to have the vehicles titled and registered with
false addresses in Des Moines County. This false information on the titles
and registration documents aids illegal aliens in avoiding detection at their
actual place of residence and in their use of false means of identification.
There is probable cause to believe that vehicles bearing Des Moines
County license plates located at the Agriprocessors' facility would contain
title and registration information that would constitute evidence of this
harboring activity and vehicle registration fraud . This Search Warrant
Application seeks authorization to search all vehicles on the
Agriprocessors property bearing license plates from Des Moines County
for titles and registration documentation and any other evidence of the
owner or use of the vehicle.
REQUEST TO SEARCH AND SEIZE COMPUTER SYSTEM

114.

The foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that evidence of
criminal activity is stored on the premises in the form of computer data.
Computer hardware, software, and electronic files on the premises
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therefore may be important to this criminal investigation because they
may be used as storage devices that contain contraband, evidence,
instrumentalities, or fruits of crime in the form of electronic data. Rule 41
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the government to
search for and seize computer hardware, software, and electronic files
that are evidence of crime, contraband, instrumentalities of crime, and/or
fruits of crime. In this case, the warrant application requests permission to
search and seize all records described in Attachment #2, including
records that happen to be stored in electronic form. These records
constitute evidence of crime. This application also requests permission to
seize the computer hardware that may contain those electronic records if
it becomes necessary for reasons of practicality to remove the hardware
and conduct a search off-site.
115.

Based upon my training, experience, and consultations with ICE
Computer Forensic Agent(s), I know that information stored in an
electronic format may be found not only on the hard disk drive of a
computer, but on other computer hardware and storage media, including
back-up tapes, diskettes, CO-ROMs, handheld organizers, and other
devices capable of storing information in an electronic format. I also know
that during the search of the premises it is not always possible to search
computer hardware and storage media for data for a number of reasons,
including the following:
(A) The volume of evidence: The volume of data stored on many
computer systems and storage devices will typically be so large that it will
be highly impractical to search for data during the execution of the
physical search of the premises. Computer storage devices like hard
disks, tapes, CO-ROM's, and Digital Video Disks (DVD's), can store the
equivalent of thousands of pages of information. A single megabyte of
storage space is equivalent to 500 double-spaced pages of text. A single
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gigabyte of storage space, or 1,000 megabytes, is equivalent to 500,000
double-spaced pages of text. Storage devices capable of storing 160
gigabytes of data are now commonplace in desktop computers.
Consequently, each non-networked, desktop computer found during a
search can easily contain the equivalent of 80 million pages of date,
which, if printed out, would result in a stack of paper over four miles high.
(B) Technical requirements: Searching computer systems is a
highly technical process that requires specific expertise and specialized ·
equipment. There are so many types of computer hardware and software
in use today that it is impossible to bring to the search site all of the
necessary technical manuals and specialized equipment necessary to
conduct a thorough search. In addition, it may be necessary to consult
with computer personnel who have specific expertise in the type of
computer, software application, or operating system that is being
searched.
(C) Files may be hidden or encrypted: Computer users can attempt
to conceal data within computer equipment and storage devices through a
number of methods, including the use of innocuous or misleading
filenames and extensions. For example, files with the extension ".txt."
often are text files; however, a user can easily change the extension to
"jpg." to conceal the text file and make it appear that the file on contains
an image. Computer users can also attempt to conceal data by using
encryption, which means that a password or device , such as a "dongle" or
"keycard, " is necessary to decrypt the data into readable form. Therefore,
a substantial amount of time is necessary to extract and sort through data
that is concealed or encrypted to determine whether it is evidence ,
contraband, or instrumentalities of a crime. The forensic procedures used
to recover hidden, compressed , password-protected or encrypted files can
be extremely time consuming, even for a qualified expert. In fact, if robust
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encryption software is utilized to encrypt a file and the password is
unknown, it may be impossible to decrypt the file in order to view the
information contained within it. Files encrypted with less secure
encryption algorithms may still require considerable time or outside
agency assistance to decrypt, absent a password.
(D) Danger of the Destruction of Evidence: Computer evidence is
extremely vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or
destruction, both from external sources and from destructive code
embedded in the system as a "booby trap." In order to maintain the
integrity of the original evidence, a qualified expert may need to conduct a
forensic examination of the storage media in a controlled environment,
such as a law enforcement laboratory, where scientific procedures and
specialized software designed to protect the integrity of the original media
will be used.
116.

ICE Computer Forensic Agent(s) have also advised me that in order to
retrieve electronically stored evidence from a seized computer, agents
may be required to seize most or all of a computer system's equipment,
including hardware, peripherals, software, documentation, security
devices, and passwords. This is true because of the following:
(A) Some operating systems, software or hardware configurations
require the original equipment and/or installed software to be present in
order to access the information contained on the system.
(B) Peripheral devices that allow users to enter or retrieve data
from the storage devices vary in their compatibility with other hardware
and software.
(C) The Computer Forensic Agent may have to install software
used by the suspect on a government computer in order to retrieve
information the suspect may have stored using that software. The CFA
may need to refer to software and hardware documentation maintained by
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the suspect to complete his/her analysis iri a timely manner. The
suspect's computer documentation may also contain hand-written notes
specific to the seized computer system.
(D) Physical keys, encryption devices, dongles, and similar physical
items may be necessary to gain access to the computer equipment.
Passwords, pass-phrases, password files, and similar decryption codes
may be required to access specific information stored on the seized
computer system.
117.

Therefore, it is requested that agents executing this search warrant be
authorized to employ the following procedure upon execution of this
search warrant:
(A) After the premises have been secured, an ICE Computer
Forensic Agent and/or other law enforcement personnel trained in
searching and seizing computer data (the "computer personnel") will make
an initial review of any computer hardware and storage media to
determine if it is possible to search these items on-site in a reasonable
amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to preserve the data. If
for some unforeseen circumstances, the computer personnel are not
present during the execution of the search warrant, then all hardware,
storage media, peripherals, software, documentation, security devices,
and passwords, as defined below, will be seized and transported to an
appropriate law enforcement facility for review. The hardware and
storage media will be reviewed by appropriately trained personnel in order
to extract and seize any data that falls within the list of items to be seized,
as set forth in Attachment B.
(B) If the computer hardware and storage media cannot be
searched on-site, then the computer personnel will determine whether it is
practical to copy the data during the execution of the search in a
reasonable amount of time without jeopardizing the ability to preserve the
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data. The computer personnel will also determine if these backups will be
useable for an off-site examination conducted at a later date without the
original equipment. As stated above, some operating systems, software
or hardware configurations require the original equipment and/or installed
software to be present in order to access the information contained on the
system.
(C) If the computer personnel determine it is not practical to
perform an on-site search or make an on-site copy of the data, then all
hardware, storage media, peripherals, software, documentation, security
devices, and passwords, as defined below, will be seized and transported
to an appropriate law enforcement facility for review. The hardware and
storage media will be reviewed by appropriately trained personnel in order
to extract and seize any data that falls within the list of items to be seized,
as set forth in Attachment B.
(D) If law enforcement personnel determine, either on-site or during
a subsequent off-site search, that any hardware, storage media,
peripheral, software, security device, or data (1) is an instrumentality of
the offense stated above, meaning that it was designed or intended for
the use of, or is being or has been used, as the means of committing the
offense; (2) contains any contraband, such as counterfeit or stolen
software, child pornography, national security information, or unauthorized
access devices such as stolen credit card numbers; (3) is the fruits of
criminal activity; or (4) is otherwise criminally possessed, the property
shall be seized and not returned pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(b).
(E) Any data that is encrypted and unreadable will not be returned
unless law enforcement personnel have determined that the data is not
(1) an instrumentality of the offense, (2) a fruit of the criminal activity, (3)
contraband, (4) otherwise unlawfully possessed, or (5) evidence of the
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offense specified above.
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(F) In searching the data, the computer personnel may examine
and copy all of the data contained in the computer equipment and storage
devices to view their precise contents and determine whether the data
falls within the items to be seized, as set forth in Attachment B. In
addition, the computer personnel may search for and attempt to recover
de'Jeted, hidden, or encrypted data to determine whether the data falls
within the list of items to be seized.
(G) All hardware, storage media, peripherals, software,
documentation, security devices, and passwords that were seized for offsite examination, and are not otherwise subject to seizure, shall be
returned by the government to the subject premises within a reasonable
period of time.
118.

For purposes of this affidavit, the foregoing terms are defined as follows:
(A) Hardware: Hardware includes the following equipment: (1)
data-processing devices containing central processing units, such as
"desktop", "tower", "laptop" and "notebook" computers, hand-held
electronic organizers, and "personal digital assistants"; (2) internal and
external storage devices, including magnetic storage devices such as
hard disk drives, diskette drives, and tape drives, optical storage devices
such as CD-ROM drives, CD-R/CD-RW recorders, and DVD
drives/recorders, and other memory storage devices such as smart-card
readers.
(B) Storage Media: Storage media includes any material capable of
storing information in a manner that can be used by computer hardware to
save and/or retrieve information. Examples of storage media include
diskettes, CD-ROM's, CD-R's, CD-RW's, DVD's, DVD-R's, DVD-RW's,
magnetic tapes, ZIP disks, JAZ disks, Peerless disks, SparQ disks, ORB
disks, optical disks, smart-cards, EPROMS, and digital memory media
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such as CompactFiash, SmartMedia, Sony Memory Sticks, and USB
"thumb" or "key" drives.
(C) Peripherals: Peripherals are equipment that send data to, or
receive data from, computer hardware, but do not normally store user
data. Keyboards, mice, printers, scanners, plotters, video display
monitors, modems, cables, and certain types of facsimile machines are
examples of peripherals.
(D) Software: Software is digital information that can be interpreted
by computer hardware to direct the way hardware works. Software is
stored in electronic, magnetic, optical, or other digital form. It commonly
includes programs to run operating systems (like Microsoft "Windows"),
applications (like word-processing, graphics, or spreadsheet programs),
utilities, and communications programs.
(E) Documentation: Computer-related documentation consists of
written, recorded, printed, or electronically stored material which explains
or illustrates how to configure or use computer hardware, software, or
other related items.
(F) Securitv Devices: Security devices include physical keys,
encryption devices, "dongles", and similar physical items needed to gain
access to associated computer hardware.
(G) Passwords: Passwords include alphanumeric strings, passphrases, password files, and similar decryption codes necessary to
access data that is encrypted or otherwise inaccessible.
119.

No wire communications or electronic communications shall be
intercepted during the execution of this search warrant. I have no
information to indicate that the computer(s) to be searched operate in any
way as an Internet Web Site Host/Server, Internet File Transfer Protocol
(FTP) server, Internet Chat Server, or Internet Email forwarder or server.
As such, it would appear that the provisions of the Wire and Electronic
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Communications lnterceptio!l Act, 18 U.S.C. S 2510 et seq. do not apply.
Should information of this type be discovered, the government will
preserve it and set it aside.
120.

I have no information to indicate that any "work product" or "documentary"
materials are stored on the computer(s) to be searched, for the purpose of
disseminating it to a public newspaper, broadcast, or other similar form of
public communication. Should agents become aware of any such
materials as described in 42 U.S.C. S 2000aa, they shall be returned as
quickly as circumstances permit.

CONCLUSION

121.

Based on the above information, there is probable cause to believe that
evidence of the crimes of harboring illegal aliens in violation of Title 8,
United States Code, Sections 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), 1324(a)(1 )(A)(iv),
1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(ll), and 1324(a)(1)(8)(1); engaging in a pattern or practice
of hiring and continuing to employ undocumented aliens in violation of
Title 8, United States Code, Sections 1324a(a)(1 )(A), 1324a(a)(2) and
1324a(f)(1 ); document fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1546(b), misuse of a social security number in violation of Title
42, United States Code, Section 408(a)(7)(B); and aggravated identity
theft in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1); will
be found on the property described in Attachment 1.
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122.

The items and/or persons to be searched for, identified, and/or seized are
set out in Attachment 2. The United States requests an order sealing this
application and search warrant until entry is made on the premises to
execute the search warrant, except with respect that portion of
Attachment 2 which lists the names of the 695 people for whom there are
criminal complaints. The United States requests those names remain
sealed until further order of this Court because the criminal complaints
have been already been ordered sealed until further order of this Court,
and the names may also be victims of identity theft.

Further your affiant sayeth not.,---...

~~~~/~
David M. Hoagland, Senior Special Agent
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

;J,

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

_1_ day of May, 2008.

JON~LES
Magistrate Judge
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